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ABSTRACT
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTO SIGNIFICANT FACTORS OF MORAL
REASONING AND THEIR INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL JUDGMENT AND
INTENTIONS
by
JANET K. MULLIN MARTA. B.A. (English), Florida State University, 1977; M.T.S.
(Theological Studies), Virginia Theological Seminary, 1996.
Dissertation directed by Dr. Anusom Singhapakdi.
This dissertation is a partial test o f the Hunt-Vitell (1986, 1993) general theory o f
marketing ethics, which, along with previous tests of the model and other empirical and
theoretical work, serves as the basis for this research. The dissertation model is the most
comprehensive test o f Hunt-Vitell to date, in the sense that it tests variables at almost
every stage o f the ethical decision making process described in the Hunt-Vitell theory.
The sample was obtained through a mail survey o f American Marketing
Association (AMA) practitioner members. Empirical testing was carried out through
correlation and regression analysis. O f the seventeen hypotheses, nine were supported
and three had weak support. The findings confirm the hypothesis that marketers who
work in firms with higher corporate ethical values are more perceptive o f situations with
problematic ethical content. Personal religiousness is also positively related to such
perception; relativism, as a personal moral philosophy, is negatively related, both as
hypothesized. Though these characteristics are exogenous in the model, and somewhat
distant from actual ethical behavior, the findings are important because perception of an
ethical problem actually triggers the entire process of ethical decision making.

iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Also well supported in this research is the hypothesized predominance o f the
deontological (duty-based) evaluation over the teleological one (consequential).
Marketers who tend toward deontological reasoning make more ethical judgm ents, and
that judgm ent was found to be positively related to ethical intentions. A weak link was
found between personal relativism and teleological evaluation, as hypothesized.

Insignificant results include the fact that no support was found for a link between
a teleological evaluation and ethical judgm ent, or for a negative relationship between
personal religiousness and teleological reasoning. There was also no relationship between
higher corporate ethical values and either deontological or teleological evaluation.
Finally, the data do not support a negative relationship between personal relativism and
teleological evaluations.

iv
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Chapter I
Introduction
The subject o f business ethics is o f burgeoning interest in the business literature.
In the 1996 edition o f his classic marketing textbook, Philip Kotler lists seven trends in
marketing that necessitated his current revision; one o f them is the growing interest in
ethics. In a recent survey o f 54 firms, where respondents rated a number o f important
factors in doing business (“Ethics Still Matter,” The Virginian-Pilot, 11/20/93), 53 gave
“integrity/ethics” a top rating o f 4 and one firm gave it a 3. Though one scholar wrote that
studying ethics was like trying to “nail jello to the wall” (Lewis 1985), much work has
been done in recent years, drawing from such fields as moral philosophy, social
psychology, theology, sociology and public administration. The very volume of research,
along with the establishment o f three scholarly journals1 devoted exclusively to the
subject o f business ethics, testifies to the perceived importance o f the topic.

Importance of Ethics Research
Fundamental to an understanding o f business ethics is an underlying debate, at
both the philosophical and the practical level, about whether business actually has an
ethical dimension. At the philosophical level is the question as to whether a firm can be a
“moral agent” (i.e., the person that makes a moral decision, whether he or she is aware of
the moral nature of the dilemma or not [Jones 1991]). Can a huge global conglomerate
that exists only as a legal entity be held responsible for moral agency? Although the

1 The Journal o f Business Ethics, the Business and Professional Ethics Journal, and Business Ethics Quarterly.
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question is debated vociferously among the more philosophically minded ethicists, it is to
some extent disingenuous. After all, as De George (1990, p. 9) explains, “business
activity is human activity, [and thus] it car* be evaluated from the moral point o f view”
and “Many more people now expect companies to act morally, at least in certain instances
and within certain limits. It is no longer true that anything goes” (De George 1990, p. 4).

If this is indeed true, business people need to assess the morality of certain actions
before those are revealed on the front page of The New York Times. This may, at first
glance, seem a small requirement; after all, individuals make moral decisions almost on a
daily basis.2 But there are major differences between individuals and corporations:

Business is not structured to handle questions of values and morality, and
its managers have usually not been trained in business schools to do so.
Experience has supplied even less training along these lines. Hence, many
businesses have faced a new dilemma. They are now beginning to feel they
should respond to demands involving social values, and should take moral
issues into account in their deliberations, but do not know how to do so.
(De George 1990, p. 5).
Scholarly research in business ethics, therefore, is an attempt to address these
needs. The work has proceeded apace in the field of marketing, partly because marketers
are on the “front lines.” As Laczniak and Murphy (1991) write, “When a marketing
decision is ethically troublesome, its highly visible outcomes can be a public
embarrassment or sometimes worse” (Laczniak and Murphy 1991, p. 259). They go on to
cite a number o f ethical violations from newspaper reports and several polls showing that

2 Should I cheat on my income tax? Is it right to tell a telephone solicitor that my husband is not at home, when he is in
the living room reading the newspaper? Is it really wrong to make copies o f my Christmas letter on the Xerox
machine at the office?

2
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Americans distrust the morality o f business. And among business people, marketers are
perceived as the least trustworthy:

In a 1983 Gallup study judging the ethicalness of various occupations, the
categories salespeople and advertising practitioners were ranked at the
bottom o f the honesty and ethical standards scale (Laczniak and Murphy
1991, p. 261).
Clearly, marketers need help with ethical decision making, so researchers are addressing a
felt need in the business community when they reach for the toolbox3 o f the scientific
method to the study of marketing ethics. To recap, then, this research assumes that
business has a moral dimension, which results in ethical dilemmas for individual
businesspeople. Marketers, particularly, are often in the public eye and need to be careful
about the morality of their actions, but trustworthy guidance in such evaluations is hard to
find. This research addresses that need, by attempting to bring further clarity to the
process by which marketers make ethical decisions, in the hope that such understanding
will be a step toward helping marketers act morally; so that reports of their behavior in
The New York Times would ennoble the entire profession.

The Models
There is, however, a wide gulf between the conclusion that business ethics
requires scientific study and the determination of how to carry out such work. According
to Jones (1991, p. 366), “despite this increased attention to ethics in organizations,
theoretical and empirical examinations of ethical decision making in organizations are in

3 The description o f the scientific method as a toolbox is from Hunt’s (1991) full explication o f marketing research as
science.

3
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relatively short supply.” He goes on to list several models (Trevino 1986, Ferrell and
Gresham 1985, Hunt and Vitell 1986, and Dubinsky and Loken 1989) and to add his own.
These are all positive models, in that they theorize a process o f moral decision making as
it actually occurs. He neglects to mention some normative work, especially that by Robin
and Reidenbach (1987, 1988, 1990, 1993), whose main focus has been to describe how a
focus on ethics should be incorporated into strategic planning in marketing. It would be
misleading to conclude, however, that the firm’s ethical climate is the sole determinant o f
ethical decision making; that the individual decision maker is an empty vessel, to be filled
up with “ethical core values.”

Still, while this work serves as a reminder o f the important social component of
ethical decision making, and that positive work without normative implications can be
“barren”4, it is the positive models that function to guide empirical research. Hunt and
Vitell (1986, 1993), particularly, took care to develop a model that is “descriptive, rather
than prescriptive” (Hunt and Vitell 1986, p. 758). They called their model a “theory”,
based on Hunt’s summary o f “the three key criteria o f theory— (1) systematically related,
(2) lawlike generalizations, and (3) empirically testable” (Hunt 1991, p. 149). Thus, their
model specifies systematic relationships between constructs, which can be tested
empirically. The lawlike generalizations in the model include the presence of individual
and social components, preexistent individual characteristics that influence ethical
judgement, and the influence o f two moral philosophies, deontology and teleology.

4 Robin’s word, in a criticism o f H unt’s Three Dichotomies model (Hunt 1991. p. 31).

4
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Com ponents From M oral Philosophy
According to Robin and Reidenbach (1987), deontology and teleology5 “dominate
current thinking in moral philosophy” (Robin and Reidenbach 1987, p. 46). Murphy and
Laczniak (1981) claimed that almost all ethical theories could be classified as one or the
other. Although there are variations o f deontology and teleology in which the differences
between them are slight, in general they are quite distinct. Deontology focuses on the act
itself, while teleology assesses outcomes. As Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 6) write,
“deontological theories focus on the specific actions or behaviors o f an individual,
whereas teleological theories focus on the consequences o f the actions or behaviors.” De
George (1990) describes the differences exhaustively, allowing each theory an entire
chapter in his textbook on business ethics.

Though the presence of deontological and teleological components in ethical
decision making has such broad theoretical support as to deserve the appellation lawlike
generalization, it remains unclear how people apply these philosophies in specific
situations. This is one question of interest in the present dissertation research: do
marketers generally use both types o f reasoning, and if so, do they receive equal weight in
most decisions? In addition, this study investigates the influences o f an individual’s
religiousness and relativism on moral decision making; also, how a corporation’s ethical
values affect such decisions.

5 Robin and Reidenbach use utilitarianism instead o f teleology. Some authors use utilitarianism as the broader category
(e.g., Robin and Reidenbach, De George), while others believe that teleology encompasses utilitarianism (e.g.. Hunt
and Vitell, Schwartz). This author makes no effort to settle the question, merely following the Hunt and Vitell usage.

5
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Contributions and Topical Overview
This dissertation work, then, is an empirical test o f the Hunt and Vitell (1986,
1993) model of ethical decision making in marketing; results should make two
contributions to the discipline. First, the scale to measure religiousness is new, having
been developed specifically for use in marketing, and it is highly reliable. A good
measure o f religiousness is essential in ethics research, but such a scale could also be
helpful in other areas o f marketing (e.g., Wilkes, Burnett and Howell [1986] studied the
effect o f religiousness in consumer research). Second, the work offers a new way to
measure the relative influences o f deontological and teleological evaluations in a
marketer’s ethical decision making process. This tests the core o f the Hunt-Vitell model
and should also represent a contribution to ethics theory generally. Third, the research
assesses the effects o f an individual’s relativism and the corporation’s ethical values on
moral decision making.

The dissertation contains five chapters. This introductory chapter presents the
purpose o f the research, in the context of marketing ethics theories. The next chapter
contains a review of the literature, starting with the major theoretical models and then
becoming more focused on the model and constructs to be tested. The focus here is on the
empirical work that has already contributed to our understanding o f the constructs in the
dissertation model. Chapter three is a description of the methodology and procedures
involved in the research, and the results o f the experiment make up the fourth chapter.
Finally, chapter five is a discussion of the results and their implications, with a full
analysis of the limitations inherent in the methodology.

6
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Chapter II
Literature Review
Theory development in marketing ethics has proceeded apace in the 1980s and
1990s. Scholars have published a number o f theoretical models (e.g., Ferrell and Gresham
1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986, 1993), numerous testable propositions (e.g., Hunt and Vitell
1986; Vitell et al. 1993) and hundreds o f conceptual articles and empirical studies. This
dissertation research is grounded on one o f the models, but incorporates elements from
four o f them, so this chapter reviews three models broadly and the fourth in further depth.
Next, the chapter contains a short discussion on the question of whether the models
constitute some stage o f theory development or are really simply research frameworks.
The review will then concentrate on the variables in the dissertation model.

Marketing Ethics Frameworks
In a relatively early study o f ethical decision making in organizations, Laczniak
and Interrieden (1987, p. 304) concluded that “in the long run, organizations must not
only be concerned with what policies stimulate improved behavior but also why some
managers take unethical actions while others do not. This implies a need to understand
the cognitive value structure o f an organization’s employees.” Models of the process o f
ethical decision making in marketing situations are an attempt to address this need, and,
as such, must represent a number o f individual and environmental variables, including
constructs derived from moral philosophy, psychology, and other behavioral sciences.
Moral philosophy informs these models primarily through analysis of deontological and

7
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teleological moral reasoning; that is, how an individual makes a moral decision after
becoming aware o f the existence of an ethical dilemma. This chapter contains a detailed
discussion o f these elements o f moral philosophy in the section dealing with
deontological and teleological evaluations. Psychological research influences the models
primarily through Kohlberg’s work on cognitive moral development (CMD) and Rest’s
further work on modeling and testing the theory, both o f which are described in the
sections on Trevino’s and Jones’ models. This dissertation research is grounded explicitly
on the Hunt-Vitell (HV) model, which some (e.g., Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990) consider
to be the most complete o f the positive models. It incorporates moral philosophy and
psychology at various important points of a six-stage process o f ethical decision making.
Hunt-Vitell, therefore, receives fuller explication than the other models, through a
literature review o f results of empirical tests of the theory.

Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich— Contingency and Synthesis
Ferrell and Gresham’s 1985 model (see Figure 2-1) represents the first important
effort o f its kind within the marketing ethics research stream. It is based explicitly on
moral philosophy, but fails to incorporate knowledge from psychological research on
moral development. The focus is on the contingent factors that affect the individual
decision maker, individual (knowledge, values, attitudes, and intentions) and
organizational (significant others and opportunity). A feedback loop describes the effect
o f experience on future ethical behavior.

8
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Figure 2-1. A Contingency Model o f Ethical Decision Making in a Marketing Organization (Ferrell and
Gresham 1985, p. 89)

A further contribution in 1989 was Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich’s attempt to
bring together the original model, Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development theory
(described in further detail in the section on the Trevino model), and the Hunt-Vitell
model (see Figure 2-2). They represent a person’s stage o f cognitive moral development
as a cognition, while HV terms it a personal characteristic. This model also makes the
influence of moral philosophy explicit.
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Figure 2-2. Synthesis Integrated Model o f Ethical Decision Making in Business (Ferrell. Gresham and
Fraedrich 1989, p. 60)

Trevino

—

Person-Situation Interactionist

Trevino (1986) modeled ethical decision making as an intersection between an
individual and a situation, informed by the stage of cognitive moral development and
resulting in ethical or unethical behavior (see Figure 2-3). There is nothing here o f the
decision making process, but it performed the important function o f bringing Kohlberg’s
work, which Trevino considers “the most popular and tested theory o f moral reasoning”
(Trevino 1992, p. 445), into the business ethics models.

10
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Figure 2-3. A Person-Situation Interactionisl Model (Trevino 1986, p. 614)

Kohlberg identified three levels of moral development (see Figure 2-4), each of
which has two stages, and he and his colleagues found that people progress through the
stages in a given order, in a “clear pattern of development” (Elm and Weber 1994,
p. 342). Movement to the next stage occurs because a cognitive dissonance begins to
occur; a person begins to perceive the contradiction between his or her current level of
moral reasoning and the next higher one. Education and age are important determinants

li
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o f these levels, as people are introduced to higher level ideas that seem attractive, though
Kohlberg’s research indicates that few individuals reach stage six.

Level 1: Preconventional
Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation
Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation
Level 2: Conventional
Stage 3: “Good Boy/Nice Girl” Orientation
Stage 4: Law and Order Orientation
Level 3: Postconventional
Stage 5: Social— Contract Legalistic Orientation
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation

Figure 2-4. Kohlberg's stages o f moral development (Elm and Weber 1994, p. 342)

Trevino’s model is the least consequential, of the four, for this research. It
incorporates no component from moral philosophy and takes a more macro perspective
on the cognitive process o f ethical decision making.

Jones

—

Issue-Contingent
This most recent o f the models is Jones’ attempt to correct what he perceives as a

major flaw in the previous theoretical work: none of the models “does more than hint that
characteristics o f the moral issue itself will affect the moral decision making process”
(Jones 1991, p. 369). The model he proposes (see Figure 2-5) is based on James Rest’s
(1986) four-component model of the ethical decision making process, moderated by
organizational factors and the moral intensity inherent in the particular issue. Rest asked

12
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what psychological processes a person goes through to produce moral behavior. He
concluded that there are four psychological processes to be accomplished: ‘'(1) interpret
the situation in terms of the actions possible, and the effects o f these actions on the self
and others; (2) judge which course o f action is morally right; (3) give priority to what is
morally right over other considerations; (4) demonstrate the strength and skills to follow
through on the intention to behave morally” (Trevino 1992, p. 445).
The contribution o f Jones’ model, however, is not its focus on the moral issue,
which is represented as the triggering mechanism in all four o f the other models. The
moral issue is present explicitly, as ethical issue or ethical dilemma, in Ferrell and
Gresham (1985), Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich (1989), and Trevino (1986), and
implicitly, as perceived ethical problem, in Hunt and Vitell (1986, 1993). Probably Jones’
most important addition, in terms o f further research, was the construct moral intensity,
which the model postulates as a way to represent any ethical issue. Moral intensity has six
components:
•

Magnitude of consequences— the total harm or benefit that results from the action in
question.

•

Social consensus—the degree o f agreement within society about the relative goodness
or evil or an act.

•

Probability of effect—the determination of how likely it is both that the action will
take place and that particular results will follow.

•

Temporal immediacy—the period o f time between the action and its consequences.

•

Proximity—the social feeling o f closeness that the moral actor has for those who will
be affected by his or her action.

•

Concentration of effect—the relative seriousness of the consequences of the action.
Defrauding an elderly person, living on a fixed income, o f $1,000 may be considered
to have a more concentrated effect than defrauding a large insurance conglomerate of
$100,000, for example.
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Magnitude of Consequoncw
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Probability of Effect
Temporal Immediacy
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Concentration of Effect
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Intent

Factor*
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Authority Factors
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Figure 2-5. An Issue-Contingent Model o f Ethical Decision Making in Organizations (Jones 1991, p. 391)

Although Jones’ article included a number o f propositions, it remained for other
scholars to develop ways to measure his constructs and assess the relationships among
them (e.g., Morris and McDonald 1995, Robin et al. 1996, Singhapakdi et al. 1996). A
notable feature o f the model is the lack of a feedback loop following moral behavior.
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Hunt-Vitell— General Theory o f Marketing Ethics
In contrast to much o f the earlier work in marketing ethics, Hunt and Vitell
intended their model (1986, 1993) to be positive and descriptive. As such, it depicts
ethical decision making as a process consisting of six stages and a feedback loop. The
original version of the theory, published in 1986, contained the same relationships as the
1993 model, but far less detail o f proposed environmental and personal influences. Figure
2-6 shows the model, as revised in 1993. Because this dissertation research is grounded
on HV, a detailed review follows the figure.

Action
control

Industry environment
• Informal norms

• Formal codes
Ethical

PrababiHiss «t

Personal charactaristica
• Religion
• Value system
• Basal system

• Strength at moral

Actual

Figure 2-6. Hunt-Vitell General Theory o f Marketing Ethics (Hunt and Vitell 1993, p. 776)
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The first stage represents an attempt to describe the societal/environmental effects
that were exogenous in Ferrell and Gresham (1985) and Ferrell, Gresham and Fraedrich
(1989). Cultural, professional, industry and organizational environments combine with
personal characteristics to influence perception of the existence o f an ethical problem,
alternatives, and consequences. Personal characteristics are also affected through a
feedback loop, which implies that people evaluate previous moral choices and their
consequences and that evaluation influences future ethical decisions.
For Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989), Rest (1986), and Jones (1991), as
well as Hunt and Vitell (1993), perception is the first step in the actual process of ethical
decision making. Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 761) write that “perception of an ethical
problem situation triggers the whole process depicted by the model. If the individual does
not perceive some ethical content in a problem situation, subsequent elements of the
model do not come into play. Therefore, it is extremely important that any situations or
scenarios used to test the model empirically be perceived by respondents as having ethical
content.”
In the next stage, the individual assembles norms and consequences for further
analysis. Norms can include those as general as the Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you.”) and others that are situation-specific (e.g., client
confidentiality). Consequential information that one gathers includes the probability and
desirability o f consequences and the importance of stakeholders. These gather together
much o f Jones’ moral intensity construct: probabilities o f consequences (HV) equates to
probability o f effect (Jones); desirability of consequences (HV) could capture magnitude
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o f consequences, social consensus, temporal immediacy and concentration o f effect
(Jones); and importance of stakeholders (HV) might in many cases be proximity (Jones).
The important distinction is that HV separates the information that one gathers at this
point into categories from moral philosophy; everything to be weighed in the decision is
either a norm or a potential consequence.
After the information has been gathered, the individual arrives at what Hunt and
Vitell term “the heart of the model” (1986, p. 763), using deontological and teleological
evaluations to arrive at an ethical judgment. There may be occasions when a person does
not consider consequences, but relies solely on deontological norms when making a
decision, as there may be times when consequences are the sole determinant, but Hunt
and Vitell postulate that in most circumstances individuals use both types o f evaluation.
Ethical judgment then affects behavior through the intervention of intention (consistent
with consumer behavior theories and the Fishbein and Ajzen [1975] model), though
behavior is then further influenced by the construct action control, meaning “the extent to
which an individual actually exerts control in the enactment of an intention in a particular
situation” (Hunt and Vitell 1993, p. 780).
Hunt and Vitell’s general theory included seven testable propositions to guide
researchers in empirical tests o f the model, while also recommending that scholars could,
and should, infer many more testable relationships. For example, their second proposition
states that the intention to behave in a given manner is a function o f ethical judgment and
a teleological evaluation. Their fifth proposition states that the deontological evaluation is
a function o f the deontological norms that the moral actor applies to each alternative.
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Two propositions on Hunt and Vitell’s list will be tested explicitly in this dissertation
research:
EJ = f(DE, TE)
I = f(EJ, TE)
That is, ethical judgment is a function o f deontological and teleological evaluations and
intentions are a function o f ethical judgment and a teleological evaluation.
A number o f the other propositions have been tested since the publication of the
theory in 1986. For example, Vitell (1986) and Vitell and Hunt (1990) found that sales
and marketing managers relied on both deontological and teleological evaluations when
making ethical judgments, and that they formed intentions based on ethical judgments
and teleological considerations. Akaah (1997) and Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993)
tested the relative importance o f deontological norms and teleological evaluations. Their
results showed that marketers relied more on deontological norms than on teleological
evaluations when forming ethical judgments. Mayo and Marks (1990) confirmed the
relationships specified in the HV model, but their empirical results showed teleological
evaluations weighing more heavily than deontological norms when marketers form
ethical judgments and intentions. Their operationalizations, however, were rightly
questioned (Hunt 1990). Singhapakdi and Vitell (1990, 1991) investigated the
relationships between a number o f background factors and perceived ethical problem,
perceived alternatives, and deontological norms. They found that marketers who scored
high on the Machiavellianism scale were less likely to perceive ethical problems to be
serious, while those working in organizations that enforced codes o f ethics showed the
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opposite. High Machiavellianism was also negatively related to perceived alternatives.
Although they claim that their operationalization o f deontological norms (based on the
AMA Code o f Ethics) could pose a limitation, they confirmed a negative relationship
between Machiavellianism and deontological norms and between locus o f control and
deontological norms. Goolsby and Hunt (1992) and Sparks and Hunt (1998)
conceptualized and tested two background factors from the model: cognitive moral
development and ethical sensitivity (respectively). Singhapakdi and Vitell (1993) found
that marketers’ ethical judgments could be partially explained by personal and
professional values.

Function o f the Models in Empirical Research
These studies, and others, have confirmed a number of relationships in the HV
model and contributed considerably toward operationalizing constructs in the model.
There have been no serious challenges to the structure of the model as a description o f the
process o f ethical decision making, though some scholars question its function (e.g.,
Jones 1991), and that of the other models (e.g., Brady and Hatch 1992). The major
objections are that (1) models are static, (2) any particular model receives insufficient
testing, and (3) positive models are barren of scientific purpose. Brady and Hatch (1992)
write that models confuse theory with empiricism; the authors present their models in the
status o f theory, but they are really products o f research traditions. They solve no
problems, raise only general issues, and are confusing in terms of their causal links.
Reidenbach and Robin (1987, 1988) object that limiting moral philosophies to deontology
and teleology both assumes a high level of moral development and restricts the use of
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hybrid philosophies. In a critique o f Shelby Hunt’s Three Dichotomies Model (Hunt
1991, pp. 10-11), Robin wrote that “positive issues are barren except where they have
prescriptive implications” (Hunt 1991, p. 31).
Still, it is impossible to prescribe unless one can first describe, which is one of the
purposes o f scientific enquiry or controlled experimentation. Kerlinger (1986) defines
theory as “a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), definitions, and propositions that
present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the
purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena” (1986, p. 9). This would seem to be
an adequate representation o f the Hunt-Vitell General Theory o f Marketing Ethics. If its
relationships continue to stand up adequately under empirical testing, researchers will
have better justification for explanation and prediction; that is, to derive normative
implications.

Conceptual Model of Dissertation
The major focus o f this dissertation research is to find a way to measure the
relative influence o f deontological and teleological evaluations in a marketer’s ethical
judgment. According to Hunt and Vitell (1986), it is important to include perceived
ethical problem as a triggering mechanism, so this construct is included, too. The model
also tests relationships involving three background factors (or exogenous constructs).
Corporate ethical values, an organizational variable, has been relatively well defined and
found to be salient in a number of studies (e.g., Hunt, Wood and Chonko 1989,
Singhapakdi et al. 1995). The two individual variables that this study examines are
religiousness and relativism. Religiousness was selected as an individual variable that
20
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might be expected to be strongly related to deontological norms; relativism because it
should correlate highly with teleological considerations. Religiousness is also o f interest
because of the religious revival currently going on in the United States and elsewhere.
John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, in their book Megatrends 2000 (1990) identify “the
religious revival o f the new millennium” as one o f ten megatrends o f which marketers
should be aware, because o f their broad societal influence. It has also proved significant
in a number o f empirical studies o f ethical decision making (e.g., McNichoIs and
Zimmerer 1985; Kennedy and Lawton 1998). The research will also test the relationship
between ethical judgment and ethical intentions, in an effort to get as close to behavior as
possible, in a study o f this nature.

Endogenous Constructs
The first construct in the structural model is the trigger mechanism, perceived
ethical problem. Those who perceive an ethical problem then engage in a process o f
moral reflection, definition and, unless prevented by situational constraints, action.
Reflection is characterized by deontological and teleological evaluations, which are
weighed together in an individual’s ethical judgment. The HV model shows ethical
intentions further moderated by an estimate o f the results o f a particular ethical judgment,
though that relationship will not be tested in this study.
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Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
Moral theory is an immense subject, though business ethicists have studied it
generally according to the typology shown in Figure 2-7.
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Figure 2-7. Moral Theory (Schwartz 1996, p. 15)

A few scholars in marketing ethics have adopted the moral virtue approach (e.g.,
Williams and Murphy 1990), but have, as yet, produced no positive theory. The approach
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is promising for marketing researchers, however, especially with the growth of interest in
trust and commitment in relationship marketing.
The other two categories, teleology and deontology, are specified in the HV
model. Although the distinction between the two can become very niggling at times1,
most ethicists describe deontological reasoning as focusing on the specific action or
behavior, while teleological reasoning measures its consequences. As De George (1990)
writes:
Deontologists maintain that actions are morally right or wrong independent of
their consequences. Moral rightness and wrongness are basic and ultimate moral
terms. They do not depend on good and the production of, or failure to produce,
good. One’s duty is to do what is morally right and to avoid what is morally
wrong, irrespective o f the consequences of so doing (De George 1990, p. 63).
A deontologist believes, therefore, that one shouldn’t break a contract simply because it is
wrong to break contracts. Calling rightness and wrongness “basic and ultimate moral
terms” means that consideration o f the consequences o f an action is peripheral and
unnecessary. Some strict deontologists even believe that weighing consequences is
immoral in itself. Deontology is firmly established in Western moral philosophy, through
the Judeo-Christian tradition, the influence of Greek moral philosophers like Socrates and
Plato, and the very significant German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
Examples o f deontological norms include the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, and
Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which states that one should “act only according to that

1 De George (1990) describes rule utilitarianism as a moral philosophy that holds that “utility applies appropriately to
classes o f actions rather than to given individual actions. Thus, by looking at the general consequences o f breaking
contracts in the past, we can determine that breaking contracts is immoral. It is immoral because the bad
consequences outweigh the good consequences. We thus arrive at a rule stating that it is morally wrong to violate
contracts. By a similar analysis a rule utilitarian determines that people should not lie, steal, or murder" (De George
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maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (De
George 1990, p. 69). A central condition for all these norms is that human beings are de
facto worthy o f respect, either because they are related as children o f one Creator (JudeoChristian tradition; the Ten Commandments), or because we must accord others the
respect we desire ourselves (Golden Rule; Categorical Imperative). Kant formulated this
condition as the second version o f his Categorical Imperative: “Act so that you treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in that o f another, always as an end and never
as a means only” (De George 1990, p. 69). The two main problems for deontologists are
to determine “the ‘best’ set of rules to live by” (Hunt and Vitell 1986, p. 759) and what
happens when two or more duties come into conflict.

Teleologists, on the other hand, believe that what one should assess is the relative
merit of all the consequences o f a particular behavior, so a behavior is declared good if it
produces more good than bad consequences. Breaking a contract could be good in some
situations and bad in others. There are a number o f teleological theories, based on whose
good is to be considered. Ethical egoism centers on the idea that one should make moral
decisions based on the greatest good for oneself. Utilitarianism is often summarized by
saying that an action is right if it produces the greatest good for the greatest number of
people. Robin and Reidenbach (1987) write that this philosophy has been central for
many businesspeople, “in part because of its tradition in economics.. .Capitalistic
systems, by providing the greatest material good for the greatest number, are considered
ethical from a perspective of economic philosophy” (Robin and Reidenbach 1987, p. 47).

1990, p. 48). The distinction between such “rules" and what a deontologist perceives as "duties” is certainly very
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There are a number o f objections to teleological reasoning, and no moral
philosopher advocates a purely teleological approach; based on such an approach one
could find moral justification for the Holocaust or slavery by placing a high value on a
pure society or very high agricultural production. The standard objections include, first,
the practical problem of the time required to consider all the consequences of an action
before doing it. Second, many claim that it is impossible to know all the consequences of
an action at any given point in time. Third, whose good is to be considered and how is it
apportioned? Are we to consider numbers or aggregate good? De George (1990) offers an
example:

Action results in 1,000 units o f good for 100 people and 10 units o f good for
9,900 people. Action B results in 19.9 units of good for each o f the 10,000
people. In both cases we have a total o f 199,000 units of good. If the resulting
good at issue is the standard of living o f a community, utilitarianism would have
us conclude that there is no moral difference between the two cases (De George
1990, p. 52).
Because o f the weaknesses o f both approaches, many moral philosophers
advocate a mixed system, which has the distinct advantage o f being practical: this is how
most people actually do ethics. In marketing ethics research into the core of the HV
model, Mayo and Marks (1990) found that marketing researchers used both kinds of
moral reasoning, with the teleological effect the stronger o f the two. As they concede,
however, their operationalization o f the constructs was somewhat problematic. Hunt and
Vasquez-Parraga (1993), in probably the most definitive empirical work on this subject to
date, determined that marketers rely primarily on deontological factors (partial R2 =

slight indeed.
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.7131), and only secondarily on teleological considerations (partial R2 = .0116). This
study had extremely high goodness-of-fit indices (.999 and .994); the structural equations
model fit the data “like a glove” (Hunt and Vitell 1993, p. 779). Vitell and Hunt (1990)
found respondents using both types of evaluation, though their focus was not on
comparing effects o f deontological and teleological evaluations, but on the relative
importance o f rewards versus punishment. Akaah (1997) confirmed that deontological
considerations were primary, in a survey of a sample o f American Marketing Association
(AMA) members.

The hypotheses about deontological and teleological evaluations are embedded in
the following sections.

Perceived Ethical Problem
Calling perceived ethical problem (PEP) the triggering mechanism refers to the
fact that if individuals are not aware that an ethical dilemma exists, they do not engage in
any process o f moral reflection. Jones (1991) calls it recognition of a moral issue. In a
study relating Machiavellianism to perceived ethical problem, which has clear relevance
for the current work on relativism and perceived ethical problem, Singhapakdi (1993)
found high Machiavellianism to be significantly and inversely related to ethical
perception. This was consistent with past studies (e.g., Hegarty and Sims 1978, 1979;
Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990). In a study that operationalized elements from the HV
model and the Jones dimensions o f moral intensity, Singhapakdi et al. (1996) found that
higher moral intensity related to greater ethical perception. Vitell et al. (1993) proposed
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that there would be differences between countries in perception of ethical problems,
based on Hofstede’s (1980) masculinity/femininity dimension. Singhapakdi et al. (1994)
confirmed such differences, in a sample o f Thai and American marketers.

Most studies, however, assume this stage away by presenting respondents with a
scenario termed an ethical dilemma. The main interest has been how marketers deal with
moral situations after they recognize them. Sparks and Hunt (1998) operationalized
ethical sensitivity (listed as a personal characteristic in the HV model), based on a
conceptualization that it means one of two things: either “the ability to recognize that a
decision making situation has ethical content” or “the ability to recognize that a decision
making situation has ethical content and the ascription o f importance to the ethical issues
comprising that content” (Sparks and Hunt 1998, p. 95). They did not, however, test the
relationship between ethical sensitivity and perceived ethical problem, as specified in the
HV model. The three hypotheses that test the relationships between PEP and the three
exogenous variables are summarized in the foregoing sections. The research also tests the
relationship between PEP and ethical judgment (EJ):

HI a.

Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem
are more likely to form an ethical judgment.

H lb.

Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an ethical problem
are more likely to make a deontological evaluation.

H lc.

Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem
are more likely to make a teleological evaluation.
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Ethical Judgment
Hunt and Vitell (1986. p. 763) define ethical judgment as “the belief that a
particular alternative is the most ethical alternative” and model the construct at the
juncture between deontological and teleological evaluations. In other words, an individual
collects all the deontological and teleological factors that he or she perceives as relevant
to the moral issue, weighs them, and arrives at an ethical judgment. Hunt and Vitell
postulate that there are few instances when individuals form ethical judgments based
solely on one type o f evaluation. According to the model, ethical judgm ent affects
behavior through the intervention of ethical intentions, modified by a further, issuespecific teleological evaluation. Mayo and Marks (1990) confirmed that ethical
judgments were jointly determined by deontological and teleological evaluations. Hunt
and Vasquez-Parraga (1993, p. 87), surveying a sample of 747 sales and marketing
managers, also found that deontological and teleological evaluations “explain a high
proportion o f the variance of ethical judgment.”

To summarize, then, Mayo and Marks (1990) found the teleological evaluation
(Teleo) to be more important, but the study was somewhat flawed. Both the Akaah (1997)
and Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993) studies concluded that marketers relied more
heavily on the deontological evaluation (Deon). Therefore, the core o f this research tests
the way marketers balance Deon and Teleo in arriving at judgments o f the morality of a
situation, depending on the latter two studies as to the direction o f the hypothesis:

H2a.

Marketers who make a deontological evaluation are more likely to form an
ethical judgment.
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H2b.

Marketers who make a teleological evaluation are more likely to form an
ethical judgment.

H2c.

Marketers rely more heavily on deontological than teleological evaluations
in making ethical judgments.

Ethical Intentions
Earlier in this literature review, the author noted that the HV model specifies a
moderating teleological evaluation between ethical judgment and ethical intention. The
current study does not test this relationship, though other researchers have done so (e.g.,
Mayo and Marks 1990, Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993). As Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga
(1993, p. 79) note: “Hunt and Vitell theorize that in most situations intentions are
congruent with ethical judgments and behavior is congruent with intentions. They further
theorize that there is no direct path from deontological evaluation to intentions.” Akaah
(1997, p. 77) confirmed the first conjecture: “In terms of relative influence, marketing
professionals rely primarily on ethical judgments and secondarily on teleological factors
in making intention evaluations.” Singhapakdi et al. (1996) tested ethical intention as
related to the moral intensity inherent in a situation. A number o f researchers have
confirmed the relationship between ethical judgment and ethical intentions (e.g., Mayo
and Marks 1990, Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993, Bass, Barnett and Brown 1999). The
hypothesis that tests ethical intention, therefore, assesses the relationship with ethical
judgment:

H3.

Marketers who form an ethical judgment will have more ethical intentions.
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Exogenous Constructs
Ford and Richardson (1994, p. 206), in their review o f empirical literature on
ethical decision making, conclude that “individual factors have received by far the most
research attention in the empirical literature.” This research follows that pattern, with two
o f the background factors being individual and one organizational. All three have been
operationalized previously; those for religiousness have proven relatively unreliable, so
this research contributes a new way to operationalize this important construct.

Religiousness
Religion/religiosity/religiousness seems to fall into a forlorn category in ethics
research; people seem at a loss to define or describe it, but they “know it when they see
it.” Even Hunt and Vitell (1993) seem somewhat at a loss:
Unquestionably, an individual’s personal religion influences ethical decision
making. A priori, compared with nonreligious people, one might suspect that
the highly religious people would have more clearly defined deontological
norms and that such norms would play a stronger role in ethical judgments
(p. 780).
They are left to fall back on a priori assumptions primarily because the work
toward measurement o f religiousness has generally occurred in the fields of psychology,
theology and sociology. The one that Hunt and Vitell (1993) mention is an exception,
having been developed by Wilkes, Bumett and Howell (1986) to measure religiosity as it
affects consumer behavior. There are, however, two important problems with this
measure: (1) it contains only four items, one of which (self-described religiousness) might
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be considered a single-item measure o f the construct, and (2) the reliability o f the scale
was quite low ( a = .49 in the WBH study). Another contribution of this dissertation, then,
will be to test a more reliable and comprehensive religiousness measure for marketing
researchers.

There has been extensive scientific research done on religiousness, but, as with
many constructs in the social sciences, no measure seems capable of capturing its domain
effectively and efficiently. In general business research, the most frequently cited scale is
clearly the “Religious Orientation” scale by Gordon Allport (1967), which discerns two
dimensions: intrinsic religiousness and extrinsic religiousness. This is useful for business
research because it distinguishes between people for whom religion is an expedient
(extrinsics) and others for whom it is the central focus o f their lives (intrinsics). Indeed,
research using this distinction (e.g., Wiebe and Fleck 1980) finds significant differences
between the two types in such areas as moral standards, conscientiousness and traditional
attitudes. But though Allport is cited most often, there are numerous other studies, which
analyze religiousness on literally dozens of potential dimensions. Some o f them are more
psychologically oriented (e.g., cultic practices [Fukuyama 1961], devotionalism [King
and Hunt 1972]) and have, therefore, few implications for marketers. The construct must
be bounded before marketing researchers can operationalize it usefully.
Religiousness is almost indefinable. Whatever it is, it is broadly and deeply
interwoven in personality and culture. Sociological measures attempt to discern its
influence on cultural processes. In a paper discussing the sociological measurement o f
religiousness, Fichter (1969) wrote that “the subjective ‘experiential’ dimension o f

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

religiosity is sociologically irrelevant.. .what needs special attention here is the religious
fact o f social communion, fellowship, or association” (p. 172). Psychological measures
focus on religiousness as motivation, a personality variable, or a cognitive style
(Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990). Different measures are necessary for different purposes,
though the cognitive psychological approach is often most appropriate for marketing
research (Malhotra et al. 1996).
For marketing, an important question is how religiousness affects behavior, but
especially spending behavior. It is interesting that none o f the scales explicitly measures
attitudes and behavior regarding money. Nonetheless, Christians are aware that Jesus
Christ had firm opinions about money, more so than on most other subjects. Islamic
banking is becoming a force in the U.S., extended from the Middle East. Jews buy kosher
food and support kibbutzes in Israel. One o f the purposes of this scale, then, is to measure
this dimension o f religiousness. This is another reason why Allport’s Intrinsic-Extrinsic
orientation measurement is not very useful in marketing research; extrinsics do not
interest marketers because their religiousness is not likely to affect their spending.
Extrinsics are religious when it is convenient to be so (Kirkpatrick and Hood 1990,
quoting Donahue 1985, note that the Extrinsic scale “does a good job o f measuring the
sort o f religion that gives religion a bad name” p. 447), which means they will probably
not adjust their behavior for the sake of religious beliefs. We do need, however, to
measure intrinsic religiousness, going beyond personality and cognitive effects to how,
why, when and where people spend their money.
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Beyond behavior, though, are the affective dimensions o f religiousness; as Schwab
and Petersen (1990) write, “religiousness strongly influences our emotional experience,
our thinking, and our behavior” (p. 335). Marketing ethics research, in particular, would
be poorly served by a scale that focused solely on how people spend their money.
Religiousness affects personal moral philosophies, and thus ethical judgments (Barnett,
Bass and Brown 1996); the motivational aspects (at least) should be o f interest to
marketing managers. This scale, therefore, attempts also to measure affective
religiousness.
Another possible dimension is what might be termed “responsibility.” If people
consider themselves religious, does it then follow that they are responsible to act or
believe (not act or not believe) in specific ways? This is what might be termed a bridge
law, in that it is a means of getting from one place to another. Most studies assume the
bridge away, asking people about their beliefs and actions, but rarely trying to determine
whether there is a causal relationship between the two. Responsibility, then, attempts to
establish whether people perceive a necessary connection between religious belief and
specific actions. Specifically, this study tests the effect of a person’s religiousness on
perception o f an ethical problem and their tendency to rely more on deontological or
teleological evaluations.

H4a.

A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her perception of an
ethical problem.

H4b.

A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her tendency to rely
more on a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.

H4c.

A marketer’s religiousness is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely
more on a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
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Corporate Ethical Values
Values are deeply embedded in human personality and society and, therefore, the
literature reflects contributions from numerous disciplines, including anthropology,
sociology and psychology. According to Vinson, Scott and Lamont (1977, p. 45),
following mainly a psychological definition for application to consumer behavior, values
fall into three categories: global or generalized, domain-specific, and evaluations of
product attributes. Rokeach, perhaps the most influential scholar in values research in
psychology, defined a value as “a centrally held, enduring belief which guides actions and
judgments across specific situations and beyond immediate goals to more ultimate endstates o f existence” (Rokeach 1968, p. 161). Values are generally considered to be
“highly influential in directing the actions o f individuals in society in general and
organizations in particular” (Hunt, Wood and Chonko 1989, p. 80). If we adopt the
Vinson et al. (1977) categories, values that direct individual action within organizations
are domain-specific; that is, “people acquire values through experiences in specific
situations or domains o f activity and that behavior cannot be understood or efficiently
predicted except in the context o f a specific environment” (Vinson et al. 1977, p. 45). In a
widely read book about companies that maintain a high standard o f excellence, Peters and
Waterman (1982) conclude that almost all o f these firms have a highly developed set of
shared values at the core o f their organizations, including those related to corporate
ethics.
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Marketing research has indeed confirmed that environment has significant
influence on values, specifically ethical values. Many empirical studies (e.g., Brenner and
Molander 1977, Hegarty and Sims 1978) confirm that an organization’s ethical norms are
a major factor influencing moral decision making. Laczniak and Interrieden (1987), using
an in-basket experimental design, found the organization’s ethical stance did effect a
change in employee behavior, but only significantly when top management concern was
enhanced with codes o f ethics and tangible rewards and sanctions. Akaah and Riordan
(1989) found that a healthier ethical environment led to stronger ethical stands.
Hunt, Wood and Chonko (1989) conceptualized corporate ethical values (CEV) as
that subset o f all corporate cultural values (e.g., pricing policies, treatment of employees,
environmental policies) that have ethical dimensions. They postulated that companies
with higher corporate ethical values would have higher employee organizational
commitment. The results o f their study o f over 1,200 marketing professionals confirmed a
strong positive association between the two variables. Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993)
also confirmed a significant relationship between ethical behavior and an organization’s
culture. Their results supported “the view that a culture emphasizing ethical values may
be best developed and maintained by having salespeople and their supervisors internalize
a set of deontological norms proscribing a set of behaviors that are inappropriate, “just
not done,” and prescribing a set o f behaviors that are appropriate, “this is the way we do
things” (Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993, p. 87, italics in original). Singhapakdi et al.
(1995), using Hunt, Wood and Chonko’s scale, confirmed that “corporate ethical values
positively influence a marketer’s perceptions of the importance o f ethics and social
responsibility in achieving organizational effectiveness” (1995, p. 53).
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Based on the foregoing empirical and theoretical work, then, this study tests the
following hypothesized relationships involving corporate ethical values:

H5a.

Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be
more perceptive o f ethical problems.

H5b.

Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be
more likely to rely on deontological evaluations when making an ethical
judgment.

H5c.

Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be
more likely to rely on teleological evaluations when making an ethical
judgment.

Relativism
Forsyth (1980, 1992) developed scales to measure what he termed personal moral
philosophies— idealism and relativism. His belief is that these dimensions parallel the
moral philosophical components in the ethics models; specifically, that idealism relates
generally to deontological reasoning, and relativism to teleological reasoning. The
difference between moral philosophies and personal moral philosophies is that the latter
are tailored to the individual. Each person makes value judgments based on his or her
own integrated conceptual system, or personal moral philosophy. Forsyth (1992, p. 462)
writes that “although the number of personal moral philosophies is unlimited, most can
be contrasted in terms o f relativism or idealism.”
Relativism, according to Forsyth, is a personal moral philosophy based on
skepticism. Relativists “generally feel that moral actions depend upon the nature of the
situation and the individuals involved, and when judging others they weigh the
circumstances more than the ethical principle that was violated” (Forsyth 1992, p. 462).
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Idealism, by contrast, requires that adherents act in accord with moral laws, norms and
principles. It “describes the individual’s concern for the welfare o f others. Highly
idealistic individuals feel that harming others is always avoidable, and they would rather
not choose between the lesser of two evils which will lead to negative consequences for
other people” (Forsyth 1992, p. 462).
A number o f marketing ethics studies have adopted Forsyth’s dichotomy.
Singhapakdi el al. (1995) found both dimensions were significantly related, in opposite
directions, to a marketer’s perception about the importance of ethics and social
responsibility to their organization’s effectiveness. Highly idealistic marketers tended to
perceive that ethics were important and high relativists believed the opposite. A crosscultural study (Singhapakdi et al. 1994) confirmed differences between Thai and
American marketers on the idealism/relativism dimension, but also found idealism to be a
weaker discriminator than relativism. Sparks and Hunt (1998) and Shaub (1989)
confirmed a negative relationship between relativism and ethical sensitivity. Sparks and
Hunt (1998, p. 105) speculate that “disbelief in moral absolutes might reduce the
likelihood o f ethical violations standing out among other issues. In a world where all
issues are relativistic shades of gray, ethical issues might blend in with everything else”
and “relativists might consider ethical issues in general to be less important than
nonrelativists.” The current research investigates the effects of relativism only, not
idealism.
Ethical relativism, according to De George (1990) “implies that moral principles
are not right or wrong and cannot be rationally defended; yet moral principles frequently
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have been given rational defense, and disagreements on moral issues are argued in
rational as well as in emotional terms” (De George 1990, p. 35). As this quote implies, a
strong form o f relativism has little support among moral philosophers, though Robin and
Reidenbach (1993) argue that a bounded relativism is precisely what marketing should
look toward in developing a workable ethical philosophy. This is especially important in
international marketing, they believe, because history, time and context make important
differences in the meaning o f “ethical”; “practically and demonstrably, there are very real
differences in social expectations among cultures, and concerns about these differences
may be exacerbated as societies become more economically interdependent” (Robin and
Reidenbach 1993, p. 99).
Although Forsyth’s original description of relativism related it to teleological
evaluations o f moral dilemmas, the relationship has not been empirically tested, to the
author’s knowledge. Studies have used either idealism/relativism or deontology/teleology
and the distinctions are sometimes far from clear. This study will preserve Forsyth’s
assumption that relativism is a personal moral philosophy, by testing a model that
specifies it as a personal characteristic in the HV theoretical structure. Individuals whose
conceptual structure of morality leans toward relativism should tend to evaluate moral
situations based on their results, rather than deontological ideas o f right and wrong.

Based on the literature, therefore, this research will test the following
hypothesized relationships:

H6a.

A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her perception of an
ethical problem.
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H6b.

A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely
more on a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.

H6c.

A marketer’s relativism is positively related to his or her tendency to rely
more on a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.

H6d.

Relativistic marketers rely more on teleological than on deontological
evaluations in making an ethical judgment.

Covariates
Researchers have tested dozens of demographic and organizational covariates in
empirical studies o f business ethics. Smith and Cooper-Martin (1997) reported significant
differences in ethical perception based on age, sex and race. Singhapakdi and Vitell
(1991) found no significant relationship between the sex o f a marketer and his or her
deontological norms. Ford and Richardson (1994), in a review o f the literature on ethical
decision making, listed research on religion, nationality, sex, age, type o f education, years
o f education, employment, income, years of employment, Machiavellianism, locus of
control, and several others. Among the situational factors that have been researched are
peer group influence, top management influence, effect o f codes o f ethics and ethical
culture, organization level, degree o f industry competitiveness, and industry type. This
research measures the influence o f six covariates: age, income, sex, years of education,
type of education, and religion.

The Model and Research Hypotheses
Figure 2-8 is a pictorial representation of the hypothesized relationships in this
dissertation research, as described in the preceding review o f literature.
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Ethical
Intentions

Summary o f Research Hypotheses
Perception of an Ethical Problem
HI a.

Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an ethical problem are
more likely to form an ethical judgment.

H lb.

Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an ethical problem are
more likely to make a deontological evaluation.

H lc.

Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an ethical problem are
more likely to make a teleological evaluation.

Ethical Judgment
H2a.

Marketers who make a deontological evaluation are more likely to form an ethical
judgment.

H2b.

Marketers who make a teleological evaluation are more likely to form an ethical
judgment.

H2c.

Marketers rely more heavily on deontological than teleological evaluations in
making ethical judgments.

Ethical Intentions
H3.

Marketers who form an ethical judgment will have more ethical intentions.
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Summary o f Research Hypotheses (continued)

Religiousness/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
H4a. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her perception o f an
ethical problem.
H4b. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her tendency to relymore
on a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H4c. A marketer’s religiousness is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely more
on a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.

Corporate Ethical Values/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
H5a.

Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be more
perceptive o f ethical problems.

H5b.

Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be more
likely to rely on deontological evaluations when making an ethical judgment.

H5c.

Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical values will be more
likely to rely on teleological evaluations when making an ethical judgment.

Relativism/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
H6a.

A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her perception of an ethical
problem.

H6b. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her tendency to rely more on
a deontological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H6c. A marketer’s relativism is positively related to his or her tendency to rely more on
a teleological evaluation in making an ethical judgment.
H6d. Relativistic marketers rely more on teleological than on deontological evaluations
in making an ethical judgment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter III
Methodology and Procedures
The full explication of marketing ethics research based on the Hunt-Vitell model
in the preceding chapter sets the stage for the research design described in this chapter.
Specifically, this empirical test should provide an analysis into the ways in which
marketers make ethical judgments, and to what extent they rely on deontological and
teleological evaluations. This chapter describes the empirical work, from research design
and construct operationalization through data collection and analysis techniques.

Research Design
This research might be considered nonexperimental, because subjects were not
assigned to treatments. The subjects were AMA members willing to fill in and return
identical questionnaires. According to Spector (19), however, the distinction between
experimental and nonexperimental research designs is somewhat fluid: “the
experimental/nonexperimental distinction represents two ends of a continuum rather than
two distinct types” (p. 9). In addition to the criterion of subject assignment,
nonexperimental designs usually involve very minor, if any, manipulation o f subjects and
conditions. In this research, the purpose o f the scenario technique was precisely to
experiment with different conditions under which subjects might come to varying
conclusions on ethical questions. Since the conclusions that derive from this work result
directly from the manipulation of conditions, through scenarios, the design should be
considered experimental.
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Scenarios in Ethics Research
Social science research poses numerous measurement problems, and ethics study
is no exception. The use o f scenarios is considered a projective technique, which is
always vulnerable to criticism that people do not always act as they say they will. As
Converse and Presser (1986) write: “If we ask a hypothetical question, will we get a
hypothetical answer?” (p. 23). They note, in response, that hypothetical questions can be
valuable in certain types o f research, where they “represent an effort to standardize a
stimulus because actual experiences range so widely” (p. 23, italics in original). They also
note that the technique makes the process easier for respondents:

To respondents, vignettes offer concrete, detailed situations on which to
make judgments rather than the demand for abstract generalizations. Even
though the questions are hypothetical, vignettes reduce the need for
respondents to be insightful and conscious o f their own thought processes
(P- 26).
In order to compensate for the uncertainties of the technique, they suggest that researchers
probe for background information about respondents’ frames o f reference in particular
responses. This research does precisely that, by measuring a number o f antecedent
variables and covariates.
In terms o f this specific stream of research, Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 11) write
that the scenario technique is “well established in ethics research and. . .a suitable vehicle
for early research efforts.” One might complain that research based on the HV model
hardly qualifies as “early efforts,” but the particular goal o f quantifying the use of
deontological and teleological evaluative techniques is certainly in a formative stage. The
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use o f an established method should testify to the validity o f the results. Ethics
researchers have used the scenario technique generally, as in marketing ethics work (e.g.,
Akaah 1997), and more specifically, in evaluations o f international ethical decision
making (e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 1997) and in particular environments (e.g., marketing
research: Sparks and Hunt 1998). This survey used three scenarios to test perceived
ethical problem, deontological and teleological evaluations, ethical judgment, and ethical
intentions. Two of these scenarios (from Domoff and Tankersley [1975]) have been used
successfully in past studies (e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 1996, Singhapakdi et al. 1997). The
third scenario is an adaptation o f one Sparks and Hunt (1998) developed to measure
ethical sensitivity of marketing researchers. The adaptation was necessary because their
scenario was quite long, containing three ethical dilemmas o f varying seriousness. The
scenario for this research retained only one moral issue.

Conceptualization and O perationalization
The following section provides an explanation o f how each construct in the model
was operationalized. As noted in the literature review section, the current study tested
three constructs that are exogenous in the model: religiousness, relativism and corporate
ethical values. All fit within the first stage of the Hunt-Vitell model, as personal
characteristics (religiousness, relativism) or as a part o f the marketer’s organizational
environment (corporate ethical values). The rest o f the model represents the core o f HV:
perceived ethical problem (PEP), ethical judgment (EJ), deontological and teleological
evaluations (Deon and Teleo), and ethical intention (El). PEP, EJ, and El are
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operationalized as in previous studies, but Deon and Teleo were tested in a new way that
makes it possible to assess how marketers weigh the two types o f evaluations.

Exogenous Variables
Two of the exogenous variables are personal characteristics, chosen because they
should have strong relationships to the two different types o f moral evaluations tested in
this study. Religiousness should correlate strongly with deontological thinking, while
relativism should show high correlation with teleological reasoning. Corporate ethical
values measures environmental effects on moral reasoning, at least those present within
the marketer’s organization.

Religiousness
As noted in the previous chapter, this study used a newly developed scale (Marta
1998)1to measure religiousness. Previous scales are either very psychologically oriented,
ignoring behavior, and especially spending behavior, or relatively unreliable (the Wilkes,
Burnett and Howell [1986] scale, used in several studies of marketing ethics, had a
reliability of a = .49). The sample o f 151 was not random, because the scale is designed
to measure religiousness over several religions (Hindu, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim);
the method was, therefore, non-probability quota sampling, to ensure a large enough
group in each cell. Exploratory factor analysis (principal axis factoring) revealed that
eight items measured a unidimensional structure, explaining 58.3% o f the sample
variance. Intercorrelations were good (KMO = .913) and reliability excellent (a = .91).
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But one might ask (as indeed someone did during a focus group), “Why do
marketing researchers need a scale at all? Why not use self-evaluation? Let people define
themselves as religious or not; that way you don’t have to take the responsibility for
measuring it.” The answer is that self-evaluation should certainly be part o f any
instrument that marketers use, because of the probability that conscious awareness o f
religiousness is likely to affect behavior. Nonetheless, religiousness is a large construct,
and, as Churchill writes (1979, p. 66): “Marketers are much better served with multi-item
than single-item measures o f their constructs, and they should take the time to develop
them.” The original set o f items, therefore, contained a self-described religiousness item,
in order to help establish validity o f the instrument. Seven o f the eight items used in the
present study correlated strongly (.48-65) with self-described religiousness; the eighth
correlated less strongly (.28), but was retained because o f strong intercorrelations with the
other items. The KMO measure o f sampling adequacy was .931.
Besides the obvious question about whether self-description should be ever
considered an entirely accurate indicator, the item is particularly suspect in the context o f
religiousness. Many believe that it is prideful to say they are highly religious, as if they
were claiming similarity to Mother Teresa or Moses. The resulting items in the scale,
therefore, do not include self-description, but do take correlation into account. In
summary, given its excellent initial results, the scale seems appropriate for exploratory
use in this study.

1This paper has not been published, but is available upon request from the author. Results from the dissertation sample
will be incorporated before it is sent for potential publication.
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Corporate Ethical Values
Hunt, Wood, and Chonko (1989) developed the scale to measure corporate ethical
values (CEV), defined as “a composite of the individual ethical values o f managers and
both the formal and informal policies on ethics o f the organization” (p. 79). There are five
items on the CEV scale, which are measured by a seven-point agree/disagree scale, for
which Hunt, Wood and Chonko reported an a o f .84. A high score on the CEV scale
indicates that the marketer works in a corporate environment that emphasizes ethical
values. The scale has been validated in a number o f other studies, including Singhapakdi
et al. 1997 (a = .84) and Singhapakdi et al. 1995 (a = .85).

Relativism
Most o f the empirical work in marketing ethics has measured relativism using
Forsyth’s Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), published in 1980, which contains tenitem scales to measure both relativism and idealism. Recently, however, Sparks and Hunt
(1998) reported that a number of Forsyth’s items exhibited psychometric difficulties, so
they created a new, and shorter, scale. Of the five items, three are the Forsyth items that
performed best in the Shaub (1989) study. The other two items were original. The shorter
scale proved to have higher reliability (a = .87 in Sparks and Hunt 1998) than Forsyth’s
original ten items ( a = .81).

Endogenous Variables
Perceived ethical problem is endogenous in this model, because it is influenced by
relativism, religiousness, and corporate ethical values before it affects ethical judgment.
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The model also measures the effect o f the exogenous variables on the deontological
(Deon) and teleological (Teleo) evaluations, which together account for much of the
variance o f ethical judgment. The final stage is when the marketer establishes an ethical
intention.

Perceived Ethical Problem
This construct was measured by a single item. After respondents have read a
scenario, the questionnaire asks that they express their degree o f agreement (on a sevenpoint Likert-type scale where 1 = completely disagree and 7 = completely agree) with the
statement: “The situation above involves the [salesperson] in an ethical problem.” The
use o f a single-item measure for this construct is consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990, Singhapakdi 1993) and intuitively satisfying. Perception is
a type of sight, which is measured by a single test that determines how clearly one can
discern an object. A one-item scaled measure functions in an identical manner: one either
perceives an ethical problem or doesn’t, and beyond that the scaled nature of the item
captures how distinctly one perceives it to be a problem.

Ethical Judgment
This study also measured ethical judgment through one item, which asks
respondents to express their degree o f agreement or disagreement with the action
described in the scenario (“Please rate the marketer’s action as to how ethical you believe
it was”), measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = very unethical, 7 = very
ethical). This operationalization is consistent with previous measurements of this variable
(e.g., Mayo and Marks 1990, Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga 1993, Singhapakdi and Vitell
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1993, Singhapakdi et al. 1994). O f these studies, Mayo and Marks (1990, p. 166) worded
the question most specifically “to reflect the notion than an ethical judgment is presumed
to be influenced by both deontological and teleological evaluations,” by asking
respondents to consider both outcomes and their own values in rating how' ethical they
believed the action (of the marketer in the scenario) was. In a commentary on their
operationalization, however, Hunt (1990) points out that an individual’s use o f both types
o f evaluation is hypothesized by the HV model and, therefore, researchers may bias
results by any wording implying that respondents must use both evaluations in any ethical
decision. This study, therefore, followed Hunt’s (1990) suggested wording, as do the
other three studies cited above.

Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
This study operationalized Deon and Teleo in a different manner than have
previous studies, in an attempt to solve two problems from previous empirical work. The
first is definitional. Are Deon and Teleo constructs or processes? Hunt (1990) identifies
this issue, in his critique o f the Mayo and Marks (1990) operationalization, and states that
he believes deontological and teleological evaluations are processes. The measurement,
therefore, should be “inferred from measures o f deontological norms applied to each
alternative” (Hunt 1990, p. 175). The second problem relates to measurement, which
involves at least two issues: (1) how to determine to what extent respondents use Deon as
opposed to Teleo, and (2) how to describe deontological norms so they imply nothing
consequential. Hunt (1990), for example, criticized Mayo and Marks’ (1990) work in
terms o f the second issue: “at least five of the seven items included in the ‘deontological
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norm’ scale refer to the consequences of behaviors and, therefore, are teleological in
nature rather than deontological” (Hunt 1990, p. 176).

(

The current operationalization attempts to address all o f these issues. In terms o f

deontological norms, the problem often seems to be that researchers tend to become too
descriptive. Deontological norms are, by nature, simple and uncomplicated. “Thou shalt
not kill” and “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you” are straightforward;
they imply no assessment of whether the consequences might change the prescription. By
adding just a few more words, however, researchers have sometimes turned a statement
o f a deontological norm into one that implies consequences. That is the difference, for
example, between the simple deontological norm “This action is unethical, because lying
is wrong” and a very slight adaptation that may tend to suggest consequences: “This
action is unethical, because lying is wrong in this situation.” The deontological norms
tested in this investigation are purposefully simple statements about right and wrong.

Finally, the current operationalization attempts to deal with the evaluations as a
process and to weigh them against each other, using what Converse and Presser (1986)
call a magnitude estimation scale. Respondents read the scenario, then respond as to
whether they perceive an ethical problem (PEP) and whether they would act as the
marketer did in the scenario (EJ). If their answer to the latter question indicates they think
the action was unethical to any extent at all, they then evaluate six statements, three of
which represent applicable deontological norms. The other three suggest negative
consequences that might, realistically, result from the unethical action. The respondent is
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instructed to choose the statement that seems most important for their personal evaluation
and write “ 100” next to it. The next step is to weigh the other five statements against the
most important one, and assign a number less than 100 to each. The advantage of this
type o f scale is that it is much less constrained, so it can capture more variation. Converse
and Presser (1986, p. 30) report that Lodge’s (1981) study showed “an increase of 12%—
15% in variance explained from the use o f magnitude over ordinal scaling.” The main
problem in this kind o f measurement is to “make use o f the interesting properties o f these
measures without incurring unduly heavy tasks for the respondent or unacceptable losses
o f information” (Converse and Presser 1986, p. 31). This, then, was an important
question in pretesting; do respondents truly understand the task, or is it simply so
different from the usual survey techniques that they become confused?

Ethical Intention
We measure respondents’ ethical intentions using the same scenarios, to which
they responded by registering how likely it was that they would act as [the marketer] did
(1 = very likely, 7 = very unlikely). The scenarios are examples o f marketing behaviors
that are generally considered unethical (e.g., deception, doctoring research results), so
agreement with the action indicates less ethical intentions. The use of a single-item
measure for this construct, as with perception of an ethical problem, is in keeping with
the literature (e.g., Mayo and Marks 1990, Singhapakdi et al. 1996, Singhapakdi and
Vitell 1990) and appropriate to the nature of scenario testing; that is, because the
respondent was answering questions based on a projective technique, the only logical way
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to capture intention was to ask whether the respondent’s intent would accord with the
marketer’s intent in the scenario.

Pretesting
Fifteen individuals pretested the questionnaire. They were MBA students, who
should represent similar demographics to the survey respondents. Because o f weight
constraints in mailing costs, the pretest questionnaire contained only two scenarios (one
from Sparks and Hunt 1998 [adapted] and one from DomofFand Tankersley 1975). After
each ethical judgement item there were several blank lines, on which respondents were to
indicate why they thought each of the two behaviors was unethical. The intent was to
capture some subjective evaluation and then be able to compare their initial reaction,
described in their own words, to their reactions to the deontological and teleological items
that followed. The response was disappointing; o f the thirty answers, only three or four
could be categorized as deontological or teleological. Responses tended to be
recommendations about what to do, as in this response to the market researcher scenario:
“He should represent the original result whether it matches the expectations or not.” In
many other cases the respondents simply summarized the action from the scenario: “He
was notified of the transmission failure to operate correctly and failed to fix it properly.”

As a result, the final questionnaire contained the three scenarios, as originally
planned. None o f the individuals who participated in the pretest had any difficulty
understanding the directions for completing the deontological and teleological items.
When asked to describe the experience o f completing the questionnaire in one word, they
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responded that it was “painless1' and “easy”. They found nothing confusing or unclear,
though one person thought the Likert scale should have been fewer than seven items.
Participants required between eight and twenty minutes to complete the survey, which
time should be markedly shorter without the subjective items. They were also asked
whether they sensed any expectations, created by the language o f the questionnaire, in an
attempt to assess social desirability bias. They responded that they felt no such pressure.

As expected (because many individuals relate more to this scenario), pretest
respondents felt the warranty scenario was a more serious ethical matter than the market
researcher's dilemma. There was, however, a fairly wide variance in their responses to the
deontological and teleological items. For example, responses to the deontological item,
“The analyst’s action is wrong because it involves lying,” ranged from 0 to 100.
Responses to a teleological item from the second scenario, “The dealer's action is wrong
because he has probably lost a customer, and maybe others, through negative word-ofmouth,” ranged from 10 to 100. All in all, pretest results seemed encouraging.

Sampling Frame and Questionnaire Mailing
The American Marketing Association (AMA) polls individual members to
determine their major fields o f interest from a choice o f eight: agri-business, business,
consumer, education, health care, international, marketing research, and service. This
dissertation survey was directed to 1508 randomly selected AMA members from seven of
the eight categories, education excluded. All addresses were within the United States,
though many certainly represent businesses with international operations. The AMA’s
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Directors o f Marketing Divisions approved the questionnaire for this distribution, and
Mail Marketing Inc., the company that manages the AMA membership mailing list,
provided the mailing labels, with the proviso that they be used only once and not copied
for any purpose. A number o f the labels were determined unusable, because the addresses
were at universities and colleges. This was an unavoidable problem, as academics had
specified areas o f “interest”, rather than the type of marketing activity in which they were
involved.

The surveys were printed on two 1l"xl7" sheets o f buff-colored paper, folded and
saddle-stapled as a booklet. The cover page was a letter on official Old Dominion
University letterhead, addressed to “Fellow AMA Member” and signed by the researcher
and dissertation director. The letter was crafted carefully to accomplish several purposes:

•

Describe the project in such a way as to explain why the respondent was selected

•

Define why their participation is important to the research

•

Explain how to fill out the questionnaire and how much time it should require

•

Guarantee anonymity

•

Establish credibility' o f the project

•

Express gratitude for their support in the work

The back o f the cover letter was blank, and the six-page questionnaire followed. The last
line on the back page offered thanks for the respondent’s helpfulness. A sample of the
cover letter and survey is included in the Appendix. Included in the mailing were a self-
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addressed, prepaid business reply envelope and two brightly colored diskette labels
intended as an incentive gift. The cover letter, on official letterhead, the two signatures,
and the professional style of the questionnaire itself were meant to help establish
credibility o f the research.
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Chapter IV
Results
This chapter contains a complete discussion o f the findings from the survey of
AMA practitioner members. It begins with a discussion o f response rates and profiles o f
the respondents, then moves to the results of statistical analysis, summarizing important
descriptive statistics. The chapter concludes with an examination o f each of the research
hypotheses.

Response Rate
The questionnaires were mailed to 1508 randomly selected practitioner members
o f the AMA in mid-November, 1998. The last responses were received and entered in
mid-January, 1999. O f the 1508 packets mailed, five were returned as undeliverable and
325 people returned responses, for a total response rate o f 21.6%. This rate is consistent
with other recent ethics research that involved questionnaires directed to an AMA sample
(e.g., Singhapakdi et al. 1996 [23%], Singhapakdi et al. 1995 [22.7%]). All of the
returned data was analyzed, though a number of respondents chose not to answer certain
o f the questions. This issue will be more fully addressed in the section entitled “Missing
Data.”

Nonresponse Bias
Though the response rate o f 21.6% is adequate, it is important to try to determine
whether nonrespondents might have replied differently. Therefore, the “extrapolation”
technique of Armstrong and Overton (1977), who showed that late respondents were like
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nonrespondents, was used to compare means between early and late respondents. An
analysis o f variance (ANOVA) between the two groups on a number o f variables
(income, ethical judgment [EJ] in Situation 1, perceived ethical problem [PEP] in
Situation 2, sex, and a composite o f the eight religiousness items) revealed significant
differences between the two groups on only the religiousness composite, consistent with
interpretation as a “chance” result. The following table summarizes the results o f the
individual T-tests.
Table 4-1. T-Tests o f Early vs. Late Respondents

Variable

P-Value

Income

0.85

Ethical Judgment (Situation I)

0.25

Perceived Ethical Problem (Situation 2)

0.28

Sex

0.11

Religiousness

0.03
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Profile o f Respondents

The responses to the demographic information requested in the questionnaire are
detailed in Table 4-2, starting on page 63. The variables o f interest were: sex, primary job
function, age, years o f formal education completed, religion, type o f undergraduate
education and income. All information is reported in percentages, to facilitate
interpretation.
Slightly more than half the respondents (52.3%) were men. The average age of
respondents was 40 and income was fairly evenly distributed between four of the five
income categories listed. The income categories were purposely wide, to encourage
people to answer, though this is notoriously sensitive information.1 It is perhaps
noteworthy that only five respondents failed to record a response, compared to seven who
left the “Nature of Education” question unanswered and two who failed to list a religion.
All respondents answered the item about sex, but five left the “Years o f Formal
Education” item blank. In sum, it appears that the income categories elicited as many
responses as did the majority o f the demographic items. Income was spread quite evenly
between four of the five categories.
The item that caused the most consternation for respondents was “Primary Job
Function;” 24 people either left this item blank or wrote in a job function that was not
included on the list. Those “penciled-in” responses indicated that future questionnaires
should include at least three further categories: Product Manager, Marketing Manager,
and Other. Four categories elicited responses of 1% and less (Packing/Point of Purchase,
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Distribution/Pricing, Merchandising/Retailing, and Telemarketing), while Marketing
Communications professionals accounted for one quarter (24.6%) o f the sample and
Marketing Researchers for almost half (44.9%).
The “Nature o f Undergraduate Education” item yielded somewhat surprising
results, given that one might expect the majority o f respondents to have been business
majors in college. They were, in fact, the largest group o f respondents (42.8%), but
liberal arts majors were not far behind (41.5%). A number of people in the “Other”
category indicated that they had majored in engineering. It is interesting to note that,
especially in a sample so laden with marketing researchers, so few (8.8%) had a sciences
background.
Though the nature o f the respondents’ educational backgrounds might seem
somewhat surprising, the number of years they have devoted to formal education is as
expected. Forty-five percent reported 16—17 years o f formal education (meaning
generally that they have completed Bachelor’s degrees and/or started graduate study),
while 37.5% reported 18—19 years (consistent with completing a Master’s degree).
Finally, the sample is heavily Christian (71.2%), with (not surprisingly) no
Buddhist, Confucian or Muslim respondents at all. A small number were Hindu (0.9%)
and more were Jewish (11.1%), while the rest characterized their religion as “Other”
(6.6%)2 or “None” (10.2%). It is interesting to note that only two respondents failed to
provide an answer in this category.

1 C onverse and P resser (1 9 8 6 , p. 61) w rite that th ese q u e stio n s are generally p laced at th e en d o f the
questionnaire, reflectin g “th e sen sitiv ity o f incom e q u estio n s, w hich are the m ost v u ln e ra b le to refu sal."
2 T h ese included m em b ers o f the C hurch o f L atter-D ay S ain ts (com m only know n as M o rm o n s) and
Je h o v a h ’s W itnesses.
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Table 4-2. Profile o f Respondents
Variables

Percentage

Sex
Male
Female
Primary Job Function
Direct Marketing
Marketing Communications
Packaging/Point o f Purchase
Sales/Sales Management
Advertising
D istribution/Pricing
Merchandising/Retailing
Telemarketing
Database Marketing
Market Research
Promotions

52.3
47.7

9.6
24.6
0.3
9.0
3.7
1.0
1.0
0.8
2.8
44.9
2.3

Age
21-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70-79
80-89

17.3
37.2
28.2
13.9
1.8
1.0
0.6

Years o f Formal Education Completed
15 or fewer
16-17
18-19
20 or more

3.7
45.0
37.5
13.8

Religion
Buddhist
Christian
Confiician
Hindu
Jew
Muslim
Other
None

0.0
71.2
0.0
0.9
11.1
0.0
6.6
10.2
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Profile o f Respondents (continued)

Variables
Nature o f Undergraduate Education
Business
Liberal Arts
Sciences
Other

Percentage
42.8
41.5
8.8
6.9

Income
Less than $19,999
$20,000-549,999
$50,000-574,999
$75,000-599,999
$ 100,000 or more

0.6
23.4
26.6
20.6
28.8

Missing Data
The decision about how to treat missing data was complicated by the fact that the
questionnaire instructed certain respondents to leave portions of it blank. If the
respondent perceived the action described in the scenario as completely ethical (value of
1 on the scale) they were not to answer the deontological and teleological items, which
described the action as “wrong” or “unethical.” Respondents were also free, in comparing
the importance o f those items, to assign one or more o f them a value o f “0”, meaning the
reason was completely unimportant to them in arriving at an ethical judgment. A blank
and a zero, therefore, represented different reactions on those items. For all the remaining
variables, missing data was replaced with mode values (consistent with Vitell 1986). The
one exception was the religiousness composite variable where multiple modes existed, so
the four blanks in this column were replaced with means.
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Manipulation Check
Some o f the key responses on the questionnaire were related to the three
scenarios. It was, therefore, necessary to determine whether the scenarios were generally
perceived by the respondents as having ethical dimensions. The perceived ethical
problem items are appropriate for this purpose, because they directly measure whether
each scenario “involves an ethical problem.” This is also, as detailed earlier, considered
by Hunt and Vitell (1986) as the “triggering mechanism” o f the entire model. As
described earlier, these statements were measured using a Likert-type format, ranging
from l=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. The results reveal the mean scores of 5.54,
5.53, and 5.14 in Situations 1, 2, and 3, respectively. All three are significantly higher
(p< .05) than the neutral level (i.e., Ho: M < 4). Specifically, there were only 5
respondents who strongly disagreed that Situation 1 involved an ethical problem, 18 for
Situation 2, and 5 for Situation 3. Therefore, the vast majority o f respondents did indeed
perceive the scenarios as having problematic ethical content.

Variable Development
A number o f the variables (PEP, EJ, El) in this study were measured by single
items, though, according to Churchill (1979, p. 66) “marketers are much better served
with multi-item than single-item measures o f their constructs, and they should take the
time to develop them.” Nonetheless, these measurements have been used a number of
times in previous studies (as detailed in Chapter 3), and no researcher has been able, thus
far, to propose a better way to measure them, at least in the context o f these scenarios.
They are purposefully simple, in that they describe a single ethical issue and the resulting
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action. This format allows the researcher to use several scenarios in one instrument; as
Vitell and Hunt (1990, p. 242) noted: “For simple scenarios where respondents need only
indicate whether some practice is ethical or unethical, several scenarios can be used in
one research instrument, but with more complex scenarios.. .only one per questionnaire
appears feasible.” With only one issue and a pre-determined action in each scenario (that
is, the responses are constrained), judgment and intention are unidimensional: How
ethical was the action? Would you have behaved in the same way? The researcher has
argued earlier that perception is always unidimensional. One either sees (at least to the
extent that one would call it “seeing”) or does not; the process o f ethical decision making
is either triggered or it is not.
O f the multi-item measures, Corporate Ethical Values (CEV) and Relativism have
been used previously. Principal Axis Factor analysis on the CEV scale, using the data
collected for this study, did indeed reveal a single factor that explained 52.2% o f the
sample variance. The same analysis of the Relativism items also revealed one factor,
accounting for 44.4% o f the variance. This research, therefore, adds further confirmation
o f the validity o f these two instruments. The other multi-item measures were developed
specifically for this dissertation, and the remaining part of this section will discuss their
development.
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Religiousness
The religiousness construct was operationalized through eight statements that
were originally intended for two purposes: first, to develop a reliable, valid, and
appropriate measure o f religiousness for marketing research, and second, to find a
measure that would be reliable across a number o f religions. As discussed in Chapters 2
and 3, previous measures of religiousness were problematic. Though the Allport
“Religious Orientation Scale” has been frequently used, the point of the scale is to
differentiate between intrinsics (“having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to
internalize it and follow it fully” [Allport 1967, p. 434]) and extrinsics (who “use religion
to their own ends” [Allport 1967, p. 434]). It is difficult to imagine any research in
marketing that would need this distinction; only religiousness that results in behavior is
o f interest in marketing, and only intrinsics translate their religiousness into behavior.
The intrinsic items on the scale have also been shown to lack internal consistency and to
be o f questionable value for other than Christian religions (e.g., Genia 1993). One item,
for example, is: “If I were to join a religious group I would prefer to join (1) a Bible study
group or (2) a social fellowship.”
The other scale that has been used a few times in marketing research is that of
Wilkes, Burnett, and Howell (1986). It has the advantage of being concise (3-4 items),
but has never shown very adequate reliability (e.g., a = .67 in Singhapakdi et al. 1999),
because o f low inter-item correlations. The scale used in this research (Marta 1998)
performed markedly better in the pretest, with a reliability o f a = .91. The eight items are
listed in Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3. Religiousness Items
Religl

Spirituality is a key to living a happy life.

Relig2

I feel responsible, because of religious values, to help people who are less
fortunate than I am.

Relig3

I feel it is important to worship regularly.

Relig4

Religious faith makes life an exciting and challenging journey.

Relig5

My religious beliefs help me to accept other people as they are.

Relig6

My religion gives focus and direction to my life.

Relig7

It is vital to support religious organizations financially.

Relig8

My religious faith convinces me that it is better to focus on others than on
myself.

The data from the sample were appropriate for factoring (KMO = .93) and the
Principal Axis Factoring (PAF) method, with varimax rotation, was used for the analysis.
Sharma (1996) writes “the PAF technique assumes an implicit underlying factor model.
For this reason many researchers choose to use PAF” (p. 108), though he also notes that
there is usually little difference between the results o f PAF and Principal Components
Analysis. Varimax rotation was employed in order to improve interpretability of the
factors. As Sharma (1996) notes: “In the varimax rotation the major objective is to have a
factor structure in which each variable loads highly on one and only one factor” (p. 119).
Reliability, which will be discussed thoroughly in the section on Reliability and Validity
Assessments, was excellent (a = .95).

Table 4-4 presents the results of the factor analysis on the eight religiousness
items. All items, based on the AMA sample, loaded on a single factor, with the lowest
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factor loading greater than .70. The eight items accounted for 69.8% o f the sample
variance. No item, therefore, needed to be deleted for further analysis; the scale can be
interpreted as a composite measure o f the construct “religiousness.”

Table 4-4. Principal Axis Factoring: Religiousness
Items

Factor Loading

Religl

.71051

Relig2

.82539

Relig3

.90042

Relig4

.90259

ReligS

.82393

Relig6

.88841

Relig7

.84388

Relig8

.76899
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Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
The deontological and teleological evaluation items were specific to each
situation, to facilitate comparison between the two types o f moral reasoning. The
deontological items were quite short, succinct statements that related to the specific
behavior described in each scenario. In his response to Mayo and Marks (1990), Hunt
asked “How should future researchers attempt to measure deontological norms? The
theory suggests that researchers should focus on specific behavior or actions that are
related to a particular alternative and are inherently right or wrong irrespective of any
particular set of consequences” (Hunt 1990, p. 176). This researcher found it more useful
to stay with short statements, which reduced the risk of introducing any references to
consequences. The nine deontological evaluation items are presented in Table 4-5.
Table 4-5. Deontological Evaluation Items
Situation 1

The analyst’s action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of
his research.
The analyst’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent.
The analyst’s action is unethical because it involves lying.

Situation 2

The dealer’s action is wrong because it is manipulative.
The dealer’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent.
The dealer’s action is unethical because it involves lying.

Situation 3

The owner’s action is wrong because it compromises theintegrity of the
business.
The owner’s action is wrong because it condones fraud.
The owner’s action is unethical because it allows multiple lies to
customers.
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The teleological evaluation items are representative o f the numerous negative
consequences o f the three unethical behaviors described in the scenarios. Again, the
effort was to make them specific to the particular situation and familiar to most
marketers. Pretesting revealed no difficulties in interpretation o f either the deontological
or teleological evaluation items. Following are the nine teleological evaluation
statements.

Table 4-6. Teleological Evaluation Items
Situation I

The analyst’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the
company a lot o f money.
The analyst’s action is wrong because his supervisor might be blamed
for his dishonest behavior.
The analyst’s action is wrong because his company could lose the
account because o f his unethical behavior.

Situation 2

The dealer’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the
company a lot o f money, if the car owner chooses to sue or even report
the case to the local news media.
The dealer’s action is unethical because it reflects negatively, not only
on his own dealership, but also on the manufacturer.
The dealer’s action is wrong because he has probably lost a customer,
and maybe others, through negative word-of-mouth.

Situation 3

The owner’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the
company a lot o f money, through negative word-of-mouth.
The owner’s action is wrong because the whole company might develop
a reputation for deceiving customers.
The owner’s action is wrong because his company might end up losing
business because o f the salesperson’s exaggerations.
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Principal Components Analysis, specifying two factors, was used to examine
these items, because o f the strong theoretical background supporting the division o f
moral reasoning into duty-based (deontological) and consequentialist (teleological)
elements. The resulting factor loadings are presented in Table 4-7.

Table 4-7. Principal Components Analysis: Deontological and Teleological Evaluation
Items

Situation 1

Situation 2

Items

Factor 1

Factor 2

D1

.26206

.10598

D2

.10501

.87703

D3

.05188

.85760

T1

.82700

-.10213

T2

.79159

.14865

T3

.86964

.04218

D1

.04986

•64624

D2

-.06123

.81624

D3

.01854

.78945

T1

.75561

.20912

T2

.87339

-.10372

T3

.89378

-.07610
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Table 4-7 (continued)

Situation 3

D1

.42186

.29049

D2

.06926

.86198

D3

.04315

.85171

T1

.90169

.04078

T2

.86845

.02466

T3

.89673

.04881

The six items related to situation 1 accounted for 61.7% o f the sample variance, in
situation 2 for 65.1%, and in situation 3 for 68.6%. One notes immediately that the
division into two factors is very strong and clean in situation 2 and for all the teleological
items. The only items that did not load well were the first deontological items in
situations 1 and 3. Both had intentionally similar wording, referring to compromising the
integrity o f the work/business. Because o f these factor results, and improved reliability
without the items (described later in this section), these two items were eliminated from
further analysis. Then, for the sake of consistency, the first deontological evaluation item
in situation 2 was eliminated. Though its factor loading was entirely acceptable (.64624),
it was substantially lower than the other two deontological items in the scenario (.81624,
.78945). As a further check, reliability analyses were carried out with two- and three-item
measures for the second scenario and was found actually to be improved with two items
(a = .65) over three ( a = .61).
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Descriptive Statistics
This section provides a summary o f statistics that are relevant to the variables
measured in this study. It includes summary tables of the composite and single-item
measures used in the questionnaire. The Corporate Ethical Values (CEV) and Relativism
scales are “off the shelf’ and the Religiousness, Deontological and Teleological
Evaluation scales are part o f the potential contribution o f this research.
Table 4-8. Operationalizations o f Multi-Item Construct Measures

Construct

Formulation*

Page of
Questionnaire

Corporate Ethical
Values

[1] + [ 2 ] + 3 + 4 + 5

p. 1

6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 10

pp. 1-2

11 + 1 2 + 1 3 + 1 4 + 1 5 + 1 6 + 1 7 + 1 8

p. 2

Perceived Ethical
Problem

19 (Situation 1), 28 (Situation 2), and 37
(Situation 3)

pp. 2, 4, and 5

Ethical Judgment

20 (Situation 1), 29 (Situation 2), and 38
(Situation 3)

pp. 3, 4, and 5

23 + 26 (Situation 1), 32 + 35 (Situation 2), and
4 1 + 4 4 (Situation 3)

pp. 3, 4, and 5

21 + 2 4 + 25 (Situation 1), 30 + 33 + 34
(Situation 2), and 39 + 42 + 43 (Situation 3)

pp. 3, 4, and 5

27 (Situation I), 36 (Situation 2), and 45
(Situation 3)

pp. 3, 4, and 5

Relativism
Religiousness

Deontological
Evaluation
Teleological
Evaluation
Ethical Intention

* The numbers indicate the question numbers on the questionnaire. Items in brackets are
reverse scored.

Table 4-9 contains a summary, by way o f review, o f the wording o f the singleitem measures. The questionnaire was framed such that high scores indicate strong
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ethical values; that is, respondents who answer at the high end o f the scale strongly agree
that there is an ethical problem in the scenario, judge the action to be very unethical, and
consider themselves very unlikely to behave in the unethical manner described.

Table 4-9. Summary o f Single-Item Measures
Perceived Ethical Problem

The action described above involves an ethical problem.

Ethical Judgment

Please rate the [marketer’s] action as to how ethical you
believe it was.

Ethical Intention

I would behave as the [marketer] did in the same situation.

Two tables (4-10 and 4-11) follow, the first a summary o f descriptive statistics
and the second a correlation matrix. The descriptive statistics include means, standard
deviations, minimum and maximum values, and the number o f valid cases.
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Table 4-10. Descriptive Statistics

Construct

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Valid
Cases

CEV

7

35

27.72

6.15

325

Relativism

5

35

13.84

6.35

325

Religiousness

8

56

34.54

13.16

325

Situation 1— PEP

1

7

5.55

1.50

325

Deon

0

200

164.15

45.64

302

Teleo

0

297

132.28

83.55

299

EJ

0

7

5.07

1.53

325

El

1

7

5.86

1.49

324

Situation 2— PEP

1

7

5.53

1.80

324

Deon

2

200

146.85

54.23

284

Teleo

0

300

160.15

86.11

286

EJ

1

7

5.68

1.46

324

El

1

7

5.79

1.51

325

Situation 3— PEP

1

7

5.14

1.49

325

Deon

0

200

155.83

51.89

306

Teleo

0

297

164.10

87.44

303

EJ

1

7

5.06

1.39

324

El

1

7

5.79

1.51

325
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Table 4-11. Correlation Matrix
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Reliability and Validity Assessments
Churchill’s (1979, p. 66) “procedure for developing better measures” includes
assessing reliability and validity as steps six and seven of an eight-step process (the last
step is developing norms). He writes, “a measure is reliable to the extent that independent
but comparable measures o f the same trait of construct of a given object agree” (p. 65,
italics in original). Kerlinger (1986) puts it more simply: “Reliability is the accuracy or
precision o f a measuring instrument” (p. 405, italics in original). The test for reliability
most commonly used is coefficient alpha; in fact, Churchill maintains that “coefficient
alpha absolutely should be the first measure one calculates to assess the quality o f the
instrument” (1979, p. 68, italics in original).
The commonly quoted standard for what is “high enough” comes from Nunnally
(1967), who suggested that reliabilities o f .50 to .60 were sufficient for the introductory
stages o f research and that increasing reliability beyond .80 was generally wasteful
(because reliability can usually be increased by adding items). By these standards, all the
scales used in this research were acceptable. Reliability analysis of the five Corporate
Ethical Values items resulted in a = .84, almost exactly equal to its reported reliabilities
from previous studies (reported in Chapter 3). The five-item Relativism scale had a
reliability o f a = .79, which, though slightly lower than the a = .87 from its previous use
(also reported in Chapter 3), is certainly well within the acceptable range.
O f the new scales tested in this research, the eight-item Religiousness scale was
found to be even more reliable (a = .95) than in its initial test, based on very high
intercorrelations, as indicated in Table 4-12.
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Table 4-12. Intercorrelations Among Religiousness Items

Religl

Relig2

Relig3

Relig4

Relig5

Relig 6

Relig7

Religl

1.00

Relig2

.65

1.00

Relig3

.64

.72

1.00

Relig4

.66

.73

.86

1.00

Relig5

.57

.68

.68

.71

1.00

Relig6

.62

.71

.78

.81

.79

1.00

Relig7

.55

.68

.82

.76

.66

.74

1.00

Relig8

.49

.65

.59

.64

.71

.67

.68

Relig8

The deontological and teleological evaluation items also performed relatively well
in reliability analysis, as outlined in the table. The teleological items resulted in higher
reliabilities, but there were also three for each scenario, as opposed to two o f the
deontological evaluation items. Given that there were only two deontological items for
each scenario, the resulting reliabilities are quite acceptable, as shown in Table 4-13.
Validity can be defined as “measuring what we think we are measuring”
(Kerlinger 1986, p. 417). There are three types of validity that a researcher should
examine, o f which one is o f predominant importance:
The most important classification of types of validity is that prepared by a
joint committee o f the American Psychological Association, the American
Educational Research Association, and the National Council on
Measurements Used in Education. Three types o f validity are discussed:
content, criterion-related, and construct. Each o f these will be examined
briefly, though we put the greatest emphasis on construct validity, since it
is probably the most important form of validity from the scientific
research point o f view (Kerlinger 1986, p. 417, italics in original).
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Table 4-13. Reliabilities o f Deontological and Teleological Evaluation Measures

Scale Items

Reliability

Deontological Evaluation
Situation 1

.70

Situation 2

.65

Situation 3

.67

Teleological Evaluation
Situation 1

.78

Situation 2

.80

Situation 3

.88

Content validity describes the extent to which the universe of content o f the topic
is represented by the measuring instrument. Churchill writes “If the sample is appropriate
and the items ‘look right,’ the measure is said to have face or content validity (Churchill
1979, p. 69, italics in original). Criterion-related validity relates to the ability o f the
instrument to predict outcomes. Construct validity is the most important; in fact,
according to Kerlinger it “is one o f the most significant scientific advances o f modem
measurement theory and practice. It is a significant advance because it links
psychometric notions and practices to theoretical notions” (1986, p. 420). The link
between measurement and theory occurs because seeking to establish construct validity
propels researchers beyond whether a measurement works (e.g., does it predict
outcomes?) to why it works. The results o f the measurement must conform to established
theory, or their construct validity is questionable.

78

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reliability is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for construct validity.
Beyond establishing reliability, then, “the analyst also must determine (1) the extent to
which the measure correlates with other measures designed to measure the same thing
and (2) whether the measure behaves as expected” (Churchill 1979, p. 70). The off-theshelf scales used in this research (CEV and Relativism) have been demonstrated in
previous research to be valid. For example, the Relativism scale revealed the expected
negative relationship between relativism and ethical sensitivity in two different studies
(Sparks and Hunt 1998; Shaub 1989). CEV correlated positively with job commitment in
one study (Hunt, Wood and Chonko 1989) and with perceptions about the importance of
ethics and social responsibility in achieving organizational effectiveness (Singhapakdi et
al. 1995).
In addition to the two previously used scales, a number of the constructs from the
Hunt-Vitell model have been extensively researched, as described in Chapter 2. Validity
checks on PEP, Ethical Judgment, and Ethical Intention, therefore, will not be repeated
here. The remaining part o f this section will be devoted to assessing the validity o f the
Religiousness, Deontological Evaluation, and Teleological Evaluation measures.

Criterion-Related Validity
In order to assess this type o f validity, it is necessary to compare scale scores with
an external criterion. As Kerlinger (1986, p. 419) observes: “The single greatest difficulty
o f criterion-related validation is the criterion. Obtaining criteria may even be difficult.” In
this case, it is most helpful to compare correlations. The eight Religiousness items
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correlate negatively with the five Relativism items, which suggests validity.
Religiousness also correlates positively with the Deontological items; Relativism with the
Teleological items. These correlations will be discussed fully in the section on
Hypothesis Testing.

Construct Validity
Churchill (1979) recommends reliability assessment as the necessary first step
toward establishing construct validity. This testifies that the scale items are internally
consistent. Then, as noted earlier, the researcher needs to examine how the scale
correlates with other measures that are designed to evaluate the same construct, and
whether the results are relatively consistent with expectations. Carmines and Zeller
(1979) describe construct validation as involving three distinct steps:
First, the theoretical relationship between the concepts themselves must be
specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the measures o f the
concepts must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be
interpreted in terms o f how it clarifies the construct validity of the
particular measure (p. 23).

The main point in construct validation, therefore, is that the theoretical basis must
be quite strong, or one can become involved with a series o f compounding errors, thereby
introducing bias. The stress throughout the rest o f this section will be on establishing the
theoretical basis for the new measures. The Deontological Evaluation measures used in
this study condemn two actions as wrong: lying and fraud. Both would be classified as
prima facie rules; that is, rules that are generally considered to be binding. According to
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De George, “Do not lie” is a prima facie rule (1990, p. 74).3 Fraud is synonymous with
deceit; both are forms o f lies. It may be that the deleted deontological evaluation items,
referring to manipulation and compromised integrity, failed to correlate strongly because
they are perceived as not relating directly to lies and fraud.

The Teleological Evaluation items are all clearly results o f unethical behavior, but
they are good examples o f the problems of establishing content validity in this type o f
research; that is, they certainly do not cover the universe o f content, because o f the nature
o f the construct. One o f the problems with consequentialist ethics is that acts have many
consequences, o f varying seriousness. It is impossible to specify all of them precisely; De
George (1990, p. 48) writes, “We cannot know all the consequences of a particular act,
nor can we know in advance, and with certainty, many o f the specific consequences of
such an act.” The teleological evaluation items used for this research, therefore, are a
sample of possible, even probable, results of unethical behavior, related to each other by
being logical outcomes o f the scenarios. These include: costing the company money,
someone else being blamed, and losing business or reputation.
The universe o f content o f the religiousness construct has proved very difficult for
scholars (in any field o f study) to delineate. De Jong, Faulkner and Warland (1976) listed
twelve studies that discovered between three and ten dimensions in religiousness. The
Allport (1967) “Religious Orientation Scale” found two dimensions (intrinsic and
extrinsic), but further studies that analyzed independent data sets have “suggested that
extrinsic religiousness consists of two distinct components” (Genia 1993, p. 284). In

3 L ying and fraud both v iolate the ninth com m andm ent, w hich p ro h ib its g iv in g false testim ony ag ain st y o u r
n eig h b o r (Exodus 20: 16). S u re ly th is counts as corroboration ( o f co n ten t validity) from an E xpen.
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terms of construct validity, however, the Marta (1998) scale has points o f congruence
with much o f the previous work. For example, four of the eight items (“My religion gives
focus and direction to my life,” “Religious faith makes life an exciting and challenging
journey,” “My religion gives focus and direction to my life,” and “Spirituality is a key to
living a happy life.”) refer to the positive effect on psychological well-being that many
theorists have described. Wiebe and Fleck (1980, p. 181) write:

Such diverse theorists as Allport, Frankl, and Jung suggest religion may
have a positive effect on psychological well-being by forming a basis of
integration for the different facets o f life, thereby providing meaning and
initiating greater emotional stability.

Most previous scales also contained an item measuring frequency o f church/worship
attendance. The current scale preserves this item, with a small modification. A
psychometric evaluation of the Allport scale (Genia 1993) noted that, although they
found correlation between worship attendance and intrinsic religiousness in all except
Unitarians, there are theoretical problems with the measurement. She concluded that “it
seems more appropriate to treat intrinsic faith and participation in religious services as
separate variables” (Genia 1993, p. 287). The modification in the current wording (“I feel
it is important to worship regularly”) attempts to have the best of both worlds, measuring
not worship attendance per se, but conviction about the value of worship.
Other items stress an orientation toward other people (“I feel responsible, because
o f religious values, to help people who are less fortunate than I am,” “My religious
beliefs help me to accept other people as they are,” “My religious faith convinces me that
it is better to focus on others than on myself.”). These are consistent with Friedrichs
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(1960), who found positive correlations between belief in God and self-reported
charitable actions, and Batson et al. (1989), who cite self-reports that “suggest a strong
desire on the part o f the more devout to show greater concern and compassion” (p. 873).
The remaining item is interesting because it is the only one that was generated
originally by the author— “It is vital to support religious organizations financially.” Its
highest correlations are with the items about worship attendance, faith as an exciting and
challenging journey, and religiousness giving focus and direction to life. The item is
logically satisfying because we generally “put our money where our mouth is”; that is,
we pay for what we value. To summarize, then, correlations and consistency with the
work o f previous scholars, along with acceptable reliabilities, testify to the construct
validity of the Religiousness and Deontological/Teleological Evaluation scales.

Hypothesis Testing
The seventeen hypotheses proposed at the end o f Chapter 2 will be evaluated in
the remaining subsections o f this chapter, using structural equation modeling through the
LISREL 8.12a program. The analysis specifications were consistent with Singhapakdi,
Vitell and Franke (1999), whose model also included religiousness, corporate ethical
values, and relativism. Specifically, the multi-item measures were summed to reduce
model complexity and their error terms fixed at 1 minus the Cronbach’s alpha value for
the scale. Error terms for the single-item measures (PEP, EJ and El) were set at 0.20.
Singhapakdi, Vitell and Franke (1999, p. 27) explain their choice o f 0.20 as somewhat
arbitrary, “but it is comparable to the median reliability across thousands of measures
analyzed by Peterson (1994), and it is somewhat more conservative than the equally
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arbitrary value of .85 used by Joreskog and Sorbom (1982).’’ The goodness-of-flt
statistics and analysis results are presented in Tables 4-14 and 4-15. The path diagrams of
all three situations follow the tables, in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.

Table 4-14. Goodness o f Fit Statistics
Situation 1

Situation 2

Situation 3

Chi-Square (10 d.f.)

26.45

18.61

23.14

Goodness o f Fit Index (GFI)

0.98

0.99

0.98

Adjusted Goodness o f Fit Index (AGFI)

0.93

0.95

0.94

Root Mean Square Residual (RMR)

0.032

0.026

0.038

The goodness o f fit statistics, taken together, reveal a very good fit. According to
Hair, et al. (1998, p. 653), this assessment requires a number of separate tests:
“Researchers have developed a number o f goodness-of-flt measures that, when used in
combination, assess the results from three perspectives: overall fit, comparative fit to a
base model, and model parsimony.” The chi-square test is considered the most
fundamental, in the sense that it is the only measure with an associated statistical test of
significance. When adjusted for degrees o f freedom, it becomes a measure o f
parsimonious fit (Hair et al. 1998, p. 658). The p-value should be nonsignificant,
meaning that the observed and estimated matrices differ considerably. Hair, et al. (1998,
p. 654) write that “The .05 significance level is recommended as the minimum accepted,
and levels o f .1 or .2 should be exceeded before nonsignificance is confirmed.” As Table
4-14 shows, the significance levels of the three models meet this criterion (.26, .19, and
.23).
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The most important criticism o f the chi-square test has been that it is too sensitive
to sample size. Hair, et al. (1998. p. 655), report that studies have shown the chi-square
functions best on samples o f between 100 and 200. The test is, therefore, suspect on this
sample o f 325. The other measures, however, confirm the good fit. The GFI (Goodnessof-Fit Index) is an overall measure; values closer to 1, as in this model (.98, .99, .98)
indicate good fit. The AGFI (Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index) is an incremental fit
measure; in other words, it compares the proposed model to the null model. Hair, et al.
(1998, p. 657), recommend that the level for this test should be greater than or equal to
.90. Again, the model fits well (.93, .95, .94). Finally, Hair, et al. (1998, p. 659),
recommend evaluating RMR values, which are averages o f residuals between observed
and estimated input matrices. These should be low, as they are in these three models
(.032, .026, .038). All measures, therefore, indicate good fit.

Table 4-15. LISREL Analysis Results
Situation 1
.043
(.66)

Situation 2
.045
(.69)

Situation 3
.16
(2.40)**

Relat-»PEP

-.079
(-1.07)

-.054
(-.72)

-.10
(-1.42)

CEV—>PEP

.22
(3.12)**

-.014
(-.21)

.17
(2.41)**

Relig—>Deon

.13
(2.00)**

.12
(1.63)

.12
(1.65)*

CEV-»Deon

-.006
(-.08)

-.12
(-1.56)

-.038
(-.51)

Relationship Tested
Relig—>PEP
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Table 4-15. LISREL Analysis Results (continued)

Relationship Tested
Relat-^Deon

Situation 1
.028
(.38)

Situation 2
-.017
(-.21)

Situation 3
.17
(2.06)**

Relig-»Teleo

.042
(.63)

.067
(1.01)

.018
(.27)

CEV—»Teleo

.007
(.10)

-.008
(-.11)

-.049
(-.70)

Relat->Teleo

.079
(1.01)

.13
(1.73)*

.14
(1.97)**

PEP->Deon

.49
(5.88)**

.34
(4.26)**

.44
(5.20)**

PEP-»Teleo

.013
(.17)

-.082
(-1.19)

.021
(.30)

PEP->EJ

.58
(7.04)**

.77
(6.90)**

.65
(7.49)**

Deon-»EJ

.32
(4.28)**

.22
(3.33)**

.22
(2.99)**

TeIeo-»EJ

.038
(.72)

.15
(2.84)**

-.033
(-.64)

.80
(7.48)**

.62
(6.32)**

.64
(7.45)**

EJ-»EI

U pper values are m easurem ent coefficients; t statistics are sh o w n in parentheses.

* P<.I

* * P <. 05
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Figure 4-1. Path Diagram for Situation 1
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Figure 4-2. Path Diagram for Situation 2
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Figure 4-3. Path Diagram for Situation 3
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Influences o f Perceived Ethical Problem
The first set o f hypotheses concern the effect o f perception o f an ethical problem
(PEP) on ethical judgment (EJ) and the deontologicai (Deon) and teleological (Teleo)
evaluations. Hypothesis la states that marketers who perceive an ethical problem will be
more likely to form an ethical judgment. As Table 4-15 indicates, this hypothesis is
supported. There is a strong relationship between PEP and EJ, as hypothesized, in each o f
the three situations (standardized coefficients o f .58, .77 and .65, respectively, in
Situations 1, 2 and 3) described on the questionnaire. Hypothesis lb states that marketers
who perceive an ethical problem are more likely to make a deontologicai evaluation. This
hypothesis is also supported by strong relationships between PEP and Deon (coefficients
o f .49, .34, .44) in all situations. The last hypothesis in this section, 1c, states that there
will be a positive relationship between PEP and Teleo, based on the idea that marketers
who perceive an ethical problem will make both types o f evaluations. This hypothesis is
not supported (.013, -.082, .021). There is no evidence in any o f the situations o f a
relationship between PEP and Teleo.

Influences o f Deontologicai and Teleological Evaluations
Hypothesis 2a posits a positive relationship between Deon and EJ; 2b a positive
relationship between Teleo and EJ. As is clear from Table 4-15, hypothesis 2a is
supported. There is a strong relationship between Deon and EJ (standardized coefficients:
.32, .22, .22) in all three situations. Hypothesis 2b, however, is only weakly supported;
there is evidence o f a relationship between Teleo and EJ (.038, .15, -.033) in only one of
the situations.
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The third hypothesis, that marketers rely more heavily on deontologicai than
teleological evaluations when arriving at an ethical judgment, was also supported.
Marketers rely more heavily on deontologicai than teleological evaluations when arriving
at an ethical judgment. The relationship between Deon and EJ is significant in all three
situations; that between Teleo and EJ in only one. The deontologicai evaluation is a
stronger predictor of ethical judgment than the teleological evaluation.

Influence o f Ethical Judgment

The single hypothesis regarding ethical intentions posits a positive relationship
between it and ethical judgment; that is, marketers who form an ethical judgment will
have more ethical intentions. As the Table 4-15 indicates, H3 is supported. There are
strong positive relationships between EJ and El (standardized coefficients: .80, .62, .64)
in all three situations.

Religiousness/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
The hypotheses about the relationships between religiousness (Relig) and the
deontologicai and teleological evaluations again are posited in terms o f positive or
negative relationships. Hypothesis 4a proposes a positive relationship between Relig and
PEP, which is weakly supported by a positive relationship in one o f the three situations
only (standardized coefficients: .043, .045, .16). The second hypothesis asserts a positive
relationship between Relig and Deon. The structural equation analysis (standardized
coefficients: .13, .12, .12) indicates the relationship is significant at p < .05 in the first
situation and at p < . 1 in the third. The /-value in the second situation is very close to that
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in the third situation (1.65 in the third and 1.63 in the second); therefore, bearing in mind
that the analysis was specified conservatively, we can generally conclude that hypothesis
4b is supported. Hypothesis 4c posits a negative relationship between Relig and Teleo.
The results indicate no relationship (.042, .067, .018), however; hypothesis 4c is not
supported.

Corporate Ethical Values/Deontological and Teleological Evaluations
The three hypotheses in this group assert positive relationships between Corporate
Ethical Values (CEV) and Perceived Ethical Problem (PEP), CEV and the Deontologicai
Evaluation (Deon), and CEV and the Teleological Evaluation (Teleo). Hypothesis 5a
proposes the relationship between CEV and PEP; this hypothesis is supported by two out
o f three significant relationships (standardized coefficients: .22, -.014, .17). Hypotheses
5b and 5c, however, are not supported. There is not a single statistically significant
relationship between CEV and Deon or Teleo4 among all three situations.

Relativism/D eontological and Teleological Evaluations
There are four hypotheses testing the relationships between Relativism (Relat),
PEP, Deon, and Teleo. Hypothesis 6a asserts a negative relationship between Relat and
PEP. As the results shown in Table 4-15 indicate (standardized coefficients: -.079, -.054,
-.10), this hypothesis is not supported. Hypothesis 6b posits a negative relationship
between Relat and Deon, which is weakly supported by one significant relationship (.028,
—.017, .17), in the third situation. The third hypothesis predicts a positive relationship

4 S tandardized coefficients for C E V -> D e o n :-.0 0 6 , - .1 2 , - .0 3 8 ; C E V —>Teleo: .0 0 7 ,- .0 0 8 ,- .0 4 9 .
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between Relat and Teleo; hypothesis 6c is supported (.079, .13, .14). The relationship in
the third situation is significant at p < .05, and that in the second situation at p < .1.
Hypothesis 6d states that more relativistic marketers will rely more on teleological than
on deontologicai evaluations. This hypothesis is also supported (see again Table 4-15) by
comparing two significant relationships between Relat and Teleo with only one between
Relat and Deon.
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Summary o f Hypothesis Testing

The following table presents the results o f all hypothesis testing, in summary
form:

Table 4-16. Results o f Hypothesis Testing
Result

Hypothesis
H la. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an
ethical problem are more likely to form an ethical judgment.

Supported

H lb. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an
ethical problem are more likely to make a deontologicai
evaluation.

Supported

H lc. Marketers who are more perceptive to the existence o f an
ethical problem are more likely to make a teleological
evaluation.

H2a. Marketers who make a deontologicai evaluation are more
likely to form an ethical judgment.
H2b. Marketers who make a teleological evaluation are more
likely to form an ethical judgment.
H2c. Marketers rely more heavily on deontologicai than
teleological evaluations in making ethical judgments.
H3.

Marketers who form an ethical judgment will have more
ethical intentions.

Not supported

Supported

Weakly supported
Supported

Supported
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Results o f Hypothesis Testing (continued)

Result

Hypothesis
H4a. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her
perception o f an ethical problem.

Weakly supported

H4b. A marketer’s religiousness is positively related to his or her
tendency to rely more on a deontologicai evaluation in
making an ethical judgment.
H4c. A marketer’s religiousness is negatively related to his or her
tendency to rely more on a teleological evaluation in making
an ethical judgment.

Supported

Not supported

Supported

H5a. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical
values will be more perceptive of ethical problems.
H5b. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical
values will be more likely to rely on deontologicai
evaluations when making an ethical judgment.

Not supported

H5c. Marketers who work in firms with higher corporate ethical
values will be more likely to rely on teleological evaluations
when making an ethical judgment.

Not supported

H6a. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her
perception o f an ethical problem.

Not supported

H6b. A marketer’s relativism is negatively related to his or her
tendency to rely more on a deontologicai evaluation in
making an ethical judgment.

Weakly supported

H6c. A marketer’s relativism is positively related to his or her
tendency to rely more on a teleological evaluation in making
an ethical judgment.

Supported

H6d. Relativistic marketers rely more on teleological than on
deontologicai evaluations in making an ethical judgment.

Supported
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Chapter V
Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose o f this dissertation has been to provide a relatively comprehensive
test o f one of the important positive theories of how marketers make ethical decisions,
specifically, the Hunt-Vitell model. More precisely, the work was to test original scales to
measure religiousness and its influence on and implications for ethical decision making,
and to assess the relative contributions o f deontologicai and teleological reasoning on
ethical judgment. The conceptual model and research hypotheses that drove the inquiry
evolved from the extensive literature review of positive work in marketing ethics, which
is detailed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 proposed methodology and procedures for the work,
the results of which are found in Chapter 4. This final chapter has five sections. The first
reviews the results o f hypothesis testing. The second describes the contribution of this
research to the field o f marketing ethics. The third section is a discussion of the
limitations of the research instrument and method, while the fourth contains suggestions
for future research to extend our understanding of ethical decision making. The fifth and
last section outlines some managerial implications deriving from the analysis.

Results of Hypothesis Testing
This research tested a relatively large number o f hypotheses; therefore, the
discussion will be divided into results from testing on exogenous (Corporate Ethical
Values [CEV], Relativism [Relat], and Religiousness [Relig]) and endogenous variables
(Perceived Ethical Problem [PEP], Deontologicai [Deon] and Teleological [Teleo]
Evaluations, Ethical Judgment [EJ], and Ethical Intentions [El]).
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Results o f Testing on Exogenous Variables
In general, the testing on exogenous variables did not find as many significant
results as that on the endogenous ones. This is to be expected, because o f the large
number o f potential exogenous constructs that may affect a marketer’s ethical decision
making process. Hunt and Vitell (1993) depict 18 in their revised model, some o f which
are very broad. These broadly sketched constructs may, in their turn, consist o f many
separate dimensions.
Corporate Ethical Values is one example. We would place this construct in the
“Organizational Environment” box (see the Hunt-Vitell Model on p. 17), which has three
bulleted items in it: informal norms, formal codes, and code enforcement. One might look
at the CEV scale and conclude that it measures all o f those items. It asks about how often
the respondent perceives it is necessary, in their company, to compromise his or her
ethics— a question about informal norms. There are several items about the results o f
unethical behavior—questions about code enforcement. The CEV also includes a
statement about top management having made it clear that unethical behavior will not be
tolerated— this might be construed as a “formal code” item. If so, the construct is being
measured by only one item, as is the construct “informal norms”. If indeed CEV attempts
to measure everything contained in the “organizational environment” description, it is a
weak attempt; it does not even ask the obvious questions about whether the respondent’s
firm has a code o f ethics or educates about it. Most likely, the CEV scale is an attempt to
measure a subset o f the exogenous variables that might exist within one’s organizational
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environment. The exogenous variables that “feed into” the ethical decision making
process, as depicted by Hunt-Vitell, therefore, number far more than 18.
O f the three hypotheses that tested CEV, one was supported. The connection that
was established was between corporate ethical values and PEP (H5a). Marketers who
work in firms with higher ethical standards are significantly more likely to perceive
correctly that a given situation has problematic ethical content. The other two
unsupported hypotheses proposed that marketers that worked in companies that they
rated higher on the CEV scale would be more likely to rely on both deontologicai (H5b)
and teleological (H5c) evaluations than those in firms that were perceived to be less
ethical work environments. We might conclude that individuals engage in the process of
ethical evaluation, after they have perceived the problem, irrespective o f the type of
environment in which they work. Perhaps they may arrive at a different conclusion (or
ethical judgment) if they work in unethical firms, or behave less ethically if the norms
encourage such behavior, but those questions lie beyond the scope o f this project.
Religiousness is also one o f numerous exogenous variables specified in the HuntVitell model, appearing both as a cultural and individual influence on ethical decision
making. The religiousness scale used to measure the construct performed excellently in
terms of reliability, but the hypothesis testing revealed mixed results. Hypothesis 4a
posited a positive relationship between Relig and PEP; this was only weakly supported.
Again, this is to be expected. Other exogenous variables in the Hunt-Vitell model (e.g.,
strength o f moral character, belief system) may overlap with and moderate the effects of
religiousness on perception o f an ethical problem.
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Hypothesis 4b, however, was fully supported in this research—religiousness is
positively related to a marketer’s tendency to rely more on a deontologicai evaluation in
making an ethical judgment. This result actually addresses two different issues raised in
this stream o f research. First is the question o f the need for a religiousness scale within
marketing research. If religiousness is related to deontologicai reasoning, we need to be
able to measure it effectively; deontologicai evaluations are at the core o f the Hunt-Vitell
model and, as discussed in Chapter 2, of much research in business ethics generally.
Second, the relationship between religiousness and the measures o f Deon used in this
research helps to demonstrate the validity o f the Deon measures. Christianity is a strongly
deontologicai religion, and most o f the respondents in this survey were Christians. The
Deon measures, therefore, demonstrate a logical relationship with the religiousness
construct—testimony that they are measuring what they are intended to measure. The
testimony to validity does not apply to the religiousness measures, however, because
marketers who are not religious still rely on deontologicai evaluations. If such a strongly
Christian sample did not tend to reason deontologically, because of the nature of
Christian morality, it would be good reason to question what the religiousness scale was
actually measuring.
The third hypothesis that tested the effect o f religiousness (H4c) proposed a
negative relationship with Teleo. This was not supported by the data. Religiousness does
not seem to affect whether individuals make a teleological evaluation when confronted
with an ethical decision. This is not an intuitively unsatisfying result; Christianity (again,
this sample population was strongly Christian) is a deontologicai belief system, but does
not generally teach against considering the consequences o f actions. Making a
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teleological evaluation seems to be a very natural human activity. De George explains it
thus: “It is reasonable for rational beings, who are able to foresee the consequences of
their actions, to choose those actions that produce more good than those that produce less
good, other things being equal” (1990, p. 44). If consequential evaluation is a reasonable
action for rational beings, it would require very intensive religious training to counteract
the impulse; American Christianity has not generally considered such training a priority
in education or preaching.
The last exogenous construct explored in this dissertation is Relativism. The four
hypotheses garnered mixed results. H6a was not supported; relativism has no significant
relationship to PEP in this sample population. This is not inconsistent with previous
research. Singhapakdi, Vitell and Franke (1999) found relativism was negatively related
to PEP in only one o f four scenarios. The next two hypotheses posited a negative
relationship between Relat and Deon (H6b) and a positive one between Relat and Teleo
(H6c). Both these hypotheses were supported, though support for the first was weak. The
negative relationship between Relat and Deon is weaker than the positive relationship
between Relat and Teleo.
The research also documented a tendency for marketers who are highly
relativistic to rely more on the teleological evaluation when making ethical judgments.
Hypothesis 6d, predicting that relativistic marketers would rely more on teleological than
deontologicai evaluations when making an ethical judgment, was supported. We can not
conclude that highly relativistic marketers are less likely to perceive the existence of an
ethical problem, but there is a tendency for more relativistic marketers to weigh
consequences more heavily than deontologicai norms in their ethical evaluations.
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Results o f Testing on Endogenous Variables
This research confirmed relationships between a number o f the endogenous
constructs represented in the Hunt-Vitell model, further corroborating their theory. Five
o f the seven hypotheses were supported. Of the three related to PEP, the research
confirmed a link between PEP and EJ (HIa); that is, marketers who perceive the
existence o f an ethical problem are more likely to form an ethical judgment. Those
marketers are also significantly more likely to make a deontologicai evaluation,
supporting H lb. The third PEP hypothesis (Hlc) was not supported. This proposed that
marketers who are more perceptive to the existence of an ethical problem are more likely
to make a teleological evaluation. Again, as in the De George (1990) quote in the
previous section, this may be because evaluating consequences is simply a natural and
rational response when one is confronted with an ethical dilemma.
Also supported in this research is H31, which asserts a positive relationship
between EJ and El; therefore, marketers who form an ethical judgment have more ethical
intentions. As reviewed in Chapter 2, other researchers have confirmed this result through
previous empirical work. This link is probably the best documented one in the HuntVitell model.
Finally, at the heart o f this project has been the question o f how to measure
deontologicai and teleological evaluations and their relative weights in making ethical
judgments. The measurement results will be discussed in the Contribution and
Limitations sections, but the relative weights were the subject o f one o f the hypotheses in

1 L eaving the hypotheses about the relativ e w eights o f D eon and T eleo fo r th e end o f this section. T hey are
the m o st interesting to the researcher, w ho firm ly believes in “ leaving th e b est for last.”
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this last group. Hypothesis 2a states that marketers who make a deontologicai evaluation
are more likely to form an ethical judgment. This hypothesis was supported. The
corollary was only weakly supported, however; marketers who make a teleological
evaluation are somewhat more likely to form an ethical judgment (H2b).
Based on theory and some empirical evidence, hypothesis 2c posited that the
respondent marketers would rely more on deontologicai than on teleological evaluations
when making ethical judgments. This issue is o f fundamental importance in all research
streams that assess ethical decision making; certainly, the interest is not limited to
marketing ethics. This study supported H2c, confirming that Deon was o f relatively more
significance than Teleo for this sample of marketers.

Contribution of This Research
This work makes a number of contributions to the field of marketing ethics. First,
it provides a comprehensive test of relationships proposed in the Hunt-Vitell model of
ethical decision making. This “wide-angle” research included variables at every level of
the model save the last (see the Hunt-Vitell model on p. 17)— behavior. Perception o f an
ethical problem (PEP) was found to be significantly related to ethical judgments (EJ) and
to deontologicai evaluations (Deon). Deon was also related to EJ, and EJ, in turn, to
ethical intentions (El). It also confirmed three relationships between exogenous and
endogenous constructs: religiousness is positively related to Deon, Corporate Ethical
Values (CEV) to PEP, and relativism is negatively related to Deon and positively to
Teleo. Compared to the published articles that involve explicit tests of the model, this is
the most comprehensive.
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The second contribution from this dissertation research is the Religiousness scale
(Marta 1998). It had been pretested in development, and performed very well with this
sample. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the eight items are well represented on other
religiousness scales (testimony to their validity as measures o f the construct), and, as
detailed earlier in this chapter, they were found to be related to Deon in this research,
which is consistent with theory.
Marketing research would benefit from a reliable and valid religiousness measure
in a number o f areas. The potential application in marketing ethics is obvious, but the
construct has also been studied in reference to consumer behavior, in the U.S. (Wilkes,
Bumett and Howell, 1986) and in a comparative study between the U.S. and Japan (Sood
and Nasu 1995). This last points toward many likely applications in international
research. Mittelstaedt (1995) proposed a number of relationships between religiousness
and the marketplace, with special focus on the growing trade between the U.S. and
Muslim countries. Religiousness can affect what we trade (e.g., dietary restrictions,
insurance [which is restricted by the religious teachings o f Islam]), how we trade (e.g.,
contract law), when we trade (e.g., holy days), and how consumers fe e l about trade (e.g.,
attitudes about the acquisition o f wealth).
In assessing the current state o f the research, Mittelstaedt notes that micro
approaches to the study o f the relationship between religion and consumption behavior or
market outcomes have failed for “any combination of three reasons” (1995, p. 12). First,
it is possible that no significant differences exist that are attributable to religious reasons.
Second, differences may exist, but appropriate measurement tools have not been
developed. And third, the measurement tools may not have been used properly.
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Hirschman (1983), for example, used religious affiliation as an indicator of religiousness;
however, “religious affiliation is not an appropriate measure o f religiousness”
(Mittelstaedt 1995, p. 12). His review of the literature leads to the conclusion that the
failure o f micro approaches results from the “lack o f useful measures o f religiousness”
(p. 13). One contribution o f this dissertation is such a measure.
A third contribution addresses another measurement issue: how to determine
whether people are processing moral questions by deontologicai or teleological means.
Four studies have tried different types of measurement, but the Mayo and Marks (1990)
and Akaah (1997) studies used methods that confounded Deon and Teleo. Vitell and
Hunt (1990) found that respondents used both deontologicai and teleological reasoning,
but their main goal was to test the relative effectiveness o f reward and punishment. This
study also had a small sample size and used only one scenario. Hunt and VasquezParraga (1993) and Vitell and Hunt (1990) found that marketers relied more heavily on
the deontologicai evaluation, as in the current study, pairing each deontologicai condition
was paired with a specific result. The method used in the present research proved to be
adequately reliable, parsimonious, effective, and straightforward. It would have been
impossible, for example, to use the Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga method (a 2X2
randomized design that paired different actions and results) to study relationships
between religiousness and Deon, or PEP and Deon.
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Limitations o f Dissertation

Potential limitations o f this research include nonresponse and social desirability
bias. No evidence of bias between early and late respondents was found, based on the
“extrapolation” technique o f Armstrong and Overton (1977), who showed that late
respondents were like nonrespondents. In terms o f social desirability bias, it is clear from
the means of the perception o f an ethical problem variable (5.55 in Situation 1, 5.53 in
Situation 2, and 5.14 in Situation 3; neutral value was 4) that many respondents did not
respond in a “socially desirable” way, even though the cover letter sensitized them by
referring to the questionnaire as “part o f a national study on marketing ethics.”2 In other
words, though respondents knew the questionnaire was about ethics, many felt quite free
to respond that they did not perceive much of an ethical problem.
Another limitation may be the fact that Deon and Teleo were measured as
constructs. Hunt and Vitell believe they would be better assessed as “processes,” not
“constructs” and, therefore, “direct measures o f deontologicai evaluation and teleological
evaluation are probably inappropriate” (1993, p. 778). It is somewhat difficult to
conceptualize how this would be done, because it is very tricky to discern precisely when
a deontologicai evaluation begins to suggest consequences. Also, as discussed earlier,
treating them as constructs makes it possible to assess other relationships.

Suggestions for Future Research
Future research in the area might benefit from a specific attempt to use a multitrait
multimethod matrix to establish construct validity. For example, researchers could
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contrast results from the method used in this research with those that derive from
randomized design research like that used by Hunt and Vasquez-Parraga (1993).
Future ethics research would also profit enormously from an endeavor to find
credible methods to measure behavior. Ethical intentions are usually considered weak
predictors o f ethical behavior. The deterrent is inevitably smaller sample sizes, as
behavior would need to be measured in some type o f laboratory setting.
Also, theory-testing based on the Hunt-Vitell model cannot proceed much further
until researchers develop and test a number of new measures o f exogenous variables. For
example, surely “strength o f moral character,” “value system,” and “belief system” affect
a number o f the endogenous constructs in the model. Also, though a number of
researchers have worked with cognitive moral development (e.g., Trevino 1986, Goolsby
and Hunt 1992), none has studied it in the context of this model o f ethical decision
making.
Finally, one link in the model that begs for solid empirical evidence is the second
teleological evaluation that Hunt and Vitell posit in a direct relationship with intentions.
In other words, the model depicts a process whereby an individual considers
deontologicai and teleological factors, arrives at an ethical judgment, then goes for one
more round o f teleological evaluation before arriving at an ethical intention. An example
might have the marketing researcher consider the question o f changing data by the
following process: ‘It’s a lie, and furthermore it’s fraudulent to change this data, even
though we might lose the account if I don’t. But if I do, and someone finds out, the
company’s whole reputation would be shot. Anyway, I’m just not going to start lying

2 H unt an d V asquez-P arraga (1 9 9 3 ) deal w ith the question o f social d esira b ility bias in a very sim ilar
fashion.
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now— money’s too expensive to be earned that way. But wait! What if my supervisor
really follows through on that veiled threat to fire me if I lose the account? We don’t have
enough in savings to make more than one mortgage payment without my incom e.. . ” In
this example, everything after “but wait!” is a second, more immediate and personal
teleological evaluation. This relationship has not, to the researcher’s knowledge, been
tested. Such a test might also fulfill Hunt’s (1990) vision that deontologicai and
teleological evaluations should be tested as processes, rather than constructs.

Managerial Implications
O f the seventeen hypotheses tested in this dissertation, twelve were supported3,
with some implications for managers who are concerned with encouraging marketers
toward more ethical business decisions. First, managers should be aware o f the
relationships between personal religiousness and ethical variables. This research found
weak support relating religiousness to ethical perception, strong support for the link
between religiousness and deontologicai evaluations, and strong support for the link
between deontologicai evaluations and ethical judgment. Managers who are concerned
about ethics, therefore, need to strengthen deontologicai reasoning in their firms. One
way would be to be quite clear, especially in the context of ethics training, that the firm
does not mean for its employees to behave in ways that are inconsistent with their
religious beliefs. They might recommend that any employee who feels such pressure
should bring the matter to the Ethics Committee (or whatever body exists to oversee
ethics program implementation). If indeed there is a religious revival in progress in the

3 T hough in th ree cases the w eak support points o u t th e need fo r further em pirical rese arch in th o se areas.
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United States, companies that intend to raise ethical standards should certainly explore
ways to encourage the moral values that such revival will probably nourish.

On the other hand, results showed an inverse relationship between relativism and
deontologicai evaluations and a positive link with teleological evaluations. Corporations
that are concerned with maintaining ethical standards, therefore, should discourage
relativism. Firms that are struggling to raise standards (e.g., those that are working under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines) may find it valuable to screen for high relativism by
including a few relativism items on pre-employment tests. This may present legal
difficulties in some cases, but they may be surmountable in cases where performance has
been affected. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide reduced penalties for
organizations that demonstrate significant incorporation of ethics in their culture
(LeClair, Ferrell and Fraedrich 1998). Such cost savings may provide a rationale to
screen out potential employees that are highly relativistic.
The most critical managerial implications of this research derive from several
findings. Employees o f more ethical corporations are more likely to perceive the
problematic ethical content in a situation, and those who perceive the problems tend to
make more ethical judgments. Marketers who rely on a deontologicai evaluation are more
likely to form ethical judgments, and they rely more on deontologicai than on teleological
evaluations. Finally, drawing this all together, those who form ethical judgments are
more likely to have more ethical intentions. In other words, a corporation that works to
create an ethical culture, and to communicate that ‘"we do the right thing here” can expect
that employees will have more ethical intentions.
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This recommendation may appear hollow; after all, what corporation that wants
ethical results would not reinforce deontologicai norms? In practice, however, managers
seem a bit confused about what works. This researcher has, for the past two years, served
as a mentor at the National Conference on Ethics in America, hosted by the United States
Military Academy at West Point. The experience has yielded several conversations with
corporate ethics officers (e.g., Lockheed Martin, B. F. Goodrich). When asked about how
they balanced deontologicai with teleological considerations in ethics training, the typical
response was that they used both. “Some people won’t be convinced to do the right thing
unless you threaten them with consequences,” one responded. This seems an adequate
response, at first glance, but one needs to consider that it is much easier to talk about
consequences than to create an ethical culture.
In order to create a culture where each employee has a sense of “what we do and
don’t do here,” ethics training must focus primarily on enunciating the firm’s
deontologicai norms. CEO speeches should continuously emphasize these norms,
including specific references to “doing the right thing” for its own sake—-just because
“that’s how we do it here.” Managers at every level should recognize employees who
make hard, but right, ethical choices, irrespective of consequences, setting them up as
high-visibility role models.4 These managerial behaviors would go a long way toward
creating and maintaining a corporate culture whose employees will not hesitate to look
themselves in the mirror every morning.

4 L eC lair, Ferrell and F raedrich (19 9 8 , p. 70) refer to the Federal S en te n cin g G u id elin es as a “ca rro t and
stick” approach. T he stick is the th rea t o f sanctions; the carro t is a v o id in g p enalties. W h at is p ro p o sed here
are b etter “carrots” , th a t o f m a n ag e m en t recognition and rew ard. B ey o n d that, and o f g re a te r value to
certain em ployees, is the satisfaction o f w orking for a com pany th a t is know n to m aintain high and
uncom prom ising standards o f eth ical conduct.
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Appendix: Research Instrument
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
O cp irtraen i o f M anagem ent an d M arketing
College of B u iin e u a n d P u b lic A dm m m ration
G ra d u a te School of Buiineas a n d P u b lic A dm iniatration
.N orfolk. V irginia 23329-0220
P h o n e : (737) 683-3337

November 5,1998

Dear Fellow AMA Member
The enclosed questionnaire is part o f a national study on marketing ethics, which is part of
the dissertation requirement to earn a Ph.D. The purpose of the project is to explore ways in
which marketers make ethical decisions, and some of the background factors that may
explain why two people might make very different decisions in the same situation. We would
like very much to have the opinions o f people who actually confront these problems—
practitioner members of the American Marketing Association.
Please record your first response to questions, rather than pondering them at length. When we
describe a marketing situation, try to picture yourself in the situation and imagine how you
would react. There are no right or wrong answers to any o f the questions, so please respond
candidly. It should take you about 10-15 minima to complete the questionnaire.
Because we can contact only a small percentage o f marketers, your response is very
important. Your anonymity is strictly guaranteed; neither identifying information nor return
address is required. Please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope w e have
included. The diskette labels are yours to keep, as a small gesture o f our gratitude for your
help with our project.
We greatly appreciate your participation.

Cordially,

ianet K. Mullin Marta
Doctoral Candidate

Anusom Stnghapakdi
Associate Professor o f Marketing
Dissertation Director

014 rh rin ifM UmTcrwfy It i n e tp u i up port unity. iC D m advr action imcitation.
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The first section o f the questionnaire looks at three aspects o f ethical decision-making:
(1) the ethics o f the organization in which you work, (2) how you perceive ethics codes
generally, and (3) your religious values. Please read each statement carefully, then indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with it by circling a number to the right o f the
statement.
Strongly
disigret

1. Managers in my company often engage in
behaviors that I consider to be unethical.
2. in order to succeed in my company, it is often
necessary to compromise one’s ethics.
3.

Top management in my company has let it be
known in no uncertain terms that unethical
behaviors will not be tolerated.

4. if a manager in my company is discovered to
have engaged in unethical behavior that results
primarily in personal gain (rather than corporate
gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded.
5. If a manager in my company is discovered to
have engaged in unethical behavior that results
primarily in corporate gain (rather than personal
gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded.
6. Questions of what is ethical for everyone cannot
be resolved, because what is (im)moral is up to
the individual.
7. Different moral or ethical codes cannot be
compared as to “rightness.”
8. Moral standards are simply personal rules that
indicate how a person should behave—end are
not to be used to make judgments of others.
9. Because what I believe is morally right or wrong
may differ from other people, my moral code
cannot be meaningfully compared to anyone
elsc’s.
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Strongly
ig ra

Strongly
disagree

Strongly
agree

10. I should refrain fromjudging other people's
actions because my morel code applies only to
me.
11. Spirituality is a key to living a happy life.
12. I feel responsible, because of religious values,
to help people who are less fortunate than I am.
13. I feel it is important to worship regularly.
14. Religious faith makes life an exciting and
challenging journey.
15. My religious beliefs help me to accept other
people as they are.
16. My religion gives focus and direction to my
life.
17. It is vital to support religious organizations
financially.
18. My religious faith convinces me that it is better
to focus on others than on myself.

Next, we would tike to have your opinions on different ethical situations. Please read and consider
each o f the following three scenarios and answer the questions that follow them.
Situation 1—A research analyst is working hard to complete a statistical analysis for presentation to
the advertising agency that represents a new, and potentially valuable, account Because of various
data collection problems and budget constraints, the analyst doesn't have much faith that the figures
are representative of the product’s target audience. He believes his boss expects the figures to be
consistent with the company's initial recommendations to the company.
Action: The analyst makes adjustments that he believes are consistent with the data be has collected,
bringing them into line with the original recommendations.
Strongly
disagree

19. The action described above involves an ethical
problem.

1

Strongly
agree

2

3

4

5
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6

7

Completely
ethical

20. Please rate the analyst’s action as to how ethical
you believe it was.

I

Very
unethical

2

3

4

5

7

6

If you answered question #20 with any number greater than 1, you believe the analyst did not make
the most ethical decision. Now, please describe how you would go about assessing the ethics of the
situation, by following these steps:
(1) Read the following six reasons and decide on one that you feel is most important in your thinking
about the analyst’s action. Write “100" to the right of that reason.
(2) Next, compare the remaining reasons to the mast important one and write in values of less than
100, to represent how important each reason is to you. For example, the second reason might seem
very close to the first, so you might write 95 or 99 next to it. Other reasons may seem quite
unimportant, so you might give them 10 or 20. Remember, doa’t add the numbers, just assign any
numbers, 1-100. to represent the weight of the reasons in your personal judgment
21. The analyst’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the company a lot of
money.

______

22. The analyst’s action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of his research.

______

23. The analyst’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent

______

24. The analyst’s action is wrong because his supervisor might be blamed for his
dishonest behavior.
25. The analyst’s action is wrong because his company could lose the account because
of his unethical behavior.
26. The analyst’s action is unethical because it involves lying.

Very
likely

2 7 .1 would behava as the analyst did in the same
situation.

I

Very
unlikely

2

3

4

S

6

7

Sltaatioc 2—A person bought a new car from a franchised automobile dealership in the local area.
Eight months after the car was purchased, he began having problems with the transmission. He took
the car back to the dealer, and some minor adjustments were made. During the next few months, he
continually had a similar problem with the transmission slipping. Each time, the dealer
only
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minor adjustments on the car. Again, during the 13th month after buying the car, the man returned to
the deaJer because the transmission still was not functioning properly. At this rime, the transmission
was completely overhauled.
Action: Because the warranty was for only one year (12 months from the date of purchase), the
dealer charged the full price for parts and labor.
Strongly
disagree

Strongly
igree

Completely
ethical

Very
unethical

28. The action described above involves an ethical
problem.

29.

Please rate the dealer’s action as to how ethical
you believe it was.

I

As you did in the first situation, if you answered the last question with any number greater than 1,
please rate the following reasons in terms of how important each is to you in your thinking about the
ethics of the situation, starting with “100" by the most important reason and comparing the others.
30. The dealer's action is wrong because it could end up costing the company a lot of
money, ifthe car owner chooses to sue or even report the case to the local news
media.

______

31. The dealer’s action is wrong because it is manipulative.

______

32. The dealer’s action is wrong because it is fraudulent__________________________ ______
33. The dealer’s action is unethical because it reflects negatively, not only on his own
dealership, but also on the manufacturer.

______

34. The dealer’s action is wrong hecause he has probably lost a customer, and maybe
others, through negative word-of-mouth.

______

35. The dealer’s action is unethical because it involves lying.

______

Very
likety

3 6 . 1 would behave as the dealer did in the same
situation.
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Very
unlikely

Situation 3—A young woman, recently hired u a salesperson for a local retail store, has been
working very hard to impress her boss with her selling ability. At times, this young woman, anxious
for an order, has been a little overeager. To get the order, she exaggerates the value of the item or
withholds relevant information concerning the product she is trying to sell. No fraud or deceit is
intended by her actions; she is simply overeager.
Action: The owner of the retail store is aware of this salesperson's actions, but has done nothing to
stop such practice.
Strongly
diiigma

37.

The action described above involves an ethical
problem.

Strongly
agree

I

2

3

4

S

6

Completely
ethical

38.

Please rate the owner's action as to how ethical
you believe it was.

1

2

7

Very
unethical

3

4

S

6

7

Again, if you answered with a number greater than 1, please rate the following reasons in terms of
how important each is to you in your thinking about the ethics of the situation.
39. The owner’s action is wrong because it could end up costing the company a lot of
money, through negative word-of-mouth.

_____

40. The owner's action is wrong because it compromises the integrity of the business.

______

41. The owner’s action is wrong because it condones fraud.

______

42. The owner’s action is wrong because the whole company might develop a
reputation for deceiving customers.

______

43. The owner’s action is wrong because his company might end up losing business
because of the salesperson's exaggerations.

_____

44. The owner’s action is unethical because it allows multiple lies to customers.

______

Very
likely

45.

I would behave as the owner of the retail store
did in the same situation.
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Very
unlikely

Finally, please provide the following information for classification.

46.

Sex:

1. Male

2.

Female

47.

4S. A ge:_________
49.

Yean of formal education
completed:_
(For example: Finished high school" 12,
Finished college “ 16)

50.

Religion: □
□
□
□
□
□
□

Buddhist (i)
Christian (Catholic or Protestant) (l)
Confucian (3)
Hindu (4)
Jew (j)
Muslim 0)
Other (7) (please clarify)

□ None
51.

52.

Direct Marketing (i)
Marketing Communications m
Packaging/Point of Purchase (3)
Sales/Sales Management m
Advertising (S)
Distribution/Pricing (S)
Merchandising/Retailing (7)
Telemarketing d)
Database Marketing (9)
Market Research (io>
Promotions (i i)

(D

Nature of undergraduate education:

Income: □
□
□
□
□

□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
Q
□
□

Please indicate your primaryjob function.

□ Business (!)
□ Liberal aits (3)
□ Sciences (3)
QOther (4>(pl<

specify)

Less than 519,999 (i)
520,000-549,999 ff)
550,000-574,999 (3)
575,000-599,999 (4)
5100,000 or more (5)

A cordial “thank you* for your haipfulrmsa and for your tana.
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